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According to the personalization hypothesis, voters’ attention is shifting away from collective 
entities like political parties to individual candidates. As attitudes towards candidates are 
growing more consequential in electoral dynamics, considerable attention has been devoted to 
the question of what differentiates these from attitudes directed at parties. This literature has 
focused on the component of attitudes known as impressions, defined broadly as the content of 
attitudes. Far less attention has been devoted to exploring what differentiates party and candidate 
evaluations from each other. In addressing this gap in the literature, this thesis examines the 
claim that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations. 
 
Two methods are used to test this claim; a survey experiment conducted on a representative 
sample of Norwegian citizens, and an observational study using panel data collected during the 
run-up to the 2017 German federal election. The results support the hypothesis that candidate 
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[P]ercept and reality are not the same, and to gain an understanding of the way change in 
the external world of politics alters the popular image of political objects, we will 
ultimately have to consider not only the "real" properties of these objects but certain 
processes of individual psychology as well.  
- The American voter p. 43 
 
 
Recent research and a great deal of impressionistic evidence suggests that representative 
democracies are undergoing a process of personalization whereby individual politicians are 
displacing political parties at the center of the political stage. A key claim associated with this 
trend is that voting behavior is increasingly influenced by voters’ attitudes towards candidates 
rather than parties (Manin 1997: 219; Hayes & McAllister 1997:3). The impression that attitudes 
towards candidates have become more consequential in electoral dynamics has generated 
considerable interest in the question of what differentiates these from attitudes directed at parties. 
This literature has focused on the component of attitudes known as impressions, defined broadly 
as the content of attitudes. Far less attention has been devoted to exploring what differentiates 
party and candidate evaluations from each other. This thesis seeks to address this gap in the 
literature through both theoretical and empirical contributions. Specifically, it examines the 
claim, often made but not tested, that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias 
than party evaluations. Here, I present the background of the research question to be explored in 
the ensuing chapters. I then provide a succinct run-down of the structure of the thesis, and 
summarize the key findings. 
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1.1 Background and research question 
In their classical account of voting behavior, Campbell and colleagues (1960) described the 
effect of candidate evaluations on vote decisions as idiosyncratic short-term forces which 
occasionally defy the otherwise pervasive grasp of partisan loyalties. Incidentally, the book’s 
publication in 1960 marked the beginning of a trend towards an increasingly person-centered 
politics, with such incidents becoming more frequent (Wattenberg 1991). This trend, referred to 
in the literature as the personalization of politics, is a “process in which the political weight of 
the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the 
political group (i.e., political party) declines” (Rahat & Sheafer 2007: 65). This is evident for 
example in the growing tendency of citizens to vote on the basis of candidate evaluations (Garzia 
2014; Hayes & McAllister 1997), and the increasing use of personalized campaign strategies to 
attract voters (Brettschneider 2008; Mancini & Swanson, 1996).  
 
The literature identifies two primary causes of this trend. One is the advent of the “essentially 
personalized medium of television” (Mughan 2000: 129) which shifted the focus of news 
coverage from parties to candidates. The other is the erosion of traditional cleavage based 
politics which until the 1960s organized electoral activity around political parties. Freed from the 
“[the] social anchorage of the party” (Poguntke & Webb 2002, 14), voters turned toward “a more 
individualized and inwardly oriented style of political choice” (Garzia 2013, 67). This new style 
was individualized both in the sense that voters were more likely to omit group identity as the 
primary motivation for voting and instead base decisions on their own policy preferences and 
performance judgements, but also in the sense that they put greater emphasis on their evaluations 
of individual candidates (Garzia 2013, 67). As Wattenberg (1991: 2) explains:  
 
The parties’ ability to polarize opinion into rival camps weakened, creating a vacuum in 
the structure of electoral attitudes. Voters were thus set politically adrift and subject to 
volatile electoral swings. Like nature, politics abhors vacuum, and candidates are the 
most logical force to take the place of parties.  
 
That candidates now play a greater role in the “structure of electoral attitudes” has far reaching 
consequences. Most of all in list-based parliamentary systems, which are party-centered by 
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institutional design. As Wagner and Wessels (2012: 73) explain, greater focus on candidates 
means that “the object evaluated in order to arrive at a vote choice would be a different one than 
the object of choice, i.e. (leading)candidates instead of parties.” This is more than a troubling 
discord between theory and practice. As politicians become the object of vote decisions, they 
“become the main anchor of interpretations and evaluations in the political process” (Adam & 
Maier 2010: 213).  Because attitudes directed at parties are different from attitudes towards 
candidates, they inspire different kinds of support and opposition. 
 
For this reason, political scientists have been keen to understand what differentiates attitudes 
directed at parties from attitudes directed at candidates. Underlying this inquiry is an normative 
question about what constitutes an appropriate object of vote decisions. A common concern is 
that focus on individuals “downplay the big social/political picture in favor of human triumphs 
and tragedies” (Adam & Maier 2010: 214). This concern is proceeds from the assumption that 
attitudes towards candidates are based on superficial evaluations of personality traits and 
appearance (Bennet 2002: 45; Keeter 1987: 356). Thus understood, personalization involves a 
shift in the “focus of politics from topics to people and from parties to politicians” (Adam & 
Maier 2010: 213). Other perspectives less critical of personalization counter that personality 
types and competence assessments are relevant and appropriate in vote decisions, and that 
candidate images in no small part are made up of policy considerations (Iyengar, 1989; Schulz & 
Zeh 2003).  
 
This debate revolves around disagreements about the content of attitudes directed at parties and 
candidates. This is referred to in the attitude literature as impressions, meaning the attitude 
object’s representation in memory. Put differently, it is what we think about when we think about 
parties and candidates – our “knowledge and beliefs” about them (McGraw 2012: 187). This is a 
natural focus of the personalization literature since, It is commonly held, certain knowledge and 
beliefs are more appropriate foundations for voting behavior than others (Adam & Maier 2010).  
 
However, impressions are only one component of attitudes. Evaluations, meaning negative or 
positive dispositions associated with an attitude object, is a related but analytically distinct 
concept (McGraw 2012; Ferguson & Fukukura 2010: 4). While impressions are mental 
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representation of information stored in memory, evaluations are summary judgements based on 
that information (McGraw 2012). In the classical definition, an evaluation is a “psychological 
tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or 
disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken 1993: 1). For voters, attitudes formed along this unidimensional 
spectrum are important means of orientation in the political landscape (Redlawsk, 2006: 3), and 
powerful predictors of voting behavior (Lodge & Taber: 2013). When deciding how to vote, 
what is known about a party or a candidate is one thing ‒ the feeling of like or dislike elicited by 
that knowledge is another.  
 
The crucial role of evaluations in vote-decisions is reflected in the personalization literature. 
Indeed, one common measure of personalization is the degree to which candidate evaluations 
rather than party evaluations influence voting behavior (Gattermann & De Vreese 2017). It is 
surprising, therefore, that the considerable efforts by political scientists to examine what 
differentiates party and candidate impressions is not matched by efforts to understand what 
differentiates party and candidate evaluations.  
 
This gap in the literature is all the more surprising given the considerable, but persistently 
separate literatures devoted to understanding party and candidate evaluations. Studies that bring 
these topics together, and compare the processes involved party evaluations with those involved 
in candidate evaluations are conspicuously missing from the literature. The purpose of this thesis 
is to fill this gap, and thereby advance our understanding of the difference between a party and 
candidate-centered mode of democratic politics. 
 
In so doing, the thesis focuses specifically on the role of partisan bias in party and candidate 
evaluations. The claim that candidates are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations 
has a long history in the political science literature. It appears in Campbell and colleague’s 
(1960) claim that voting behavior deviating from the ubiquitous effect of party identification 
could be explained by the appeal of popular candidates. Moreover, the frequently stressed 
association between personalized and volatile voting behavior suggests that attitudes directed at 
candidates are less beholden to stable identities. At the same time, so-called “catch-all” parties 
are said to employ leader-centered campaign strategies in conscious efforts to attract voters 
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beyond their traditional base (Krouwel 2003: 29). The ability of candidate evaluations to cut 
through partisan divides is frequently used as an explanation of these trends, but is rarely taken 
as the thing to be explained. Doing so means looking at party and candidate evaluations in a 
comparative framework. This is the approach used in this thesis with the aim of answering the 
following research question: 
Are candidate evaluations less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations? 
 
1.2 Contributions to the literature 
In answering this question, the thesis will make several contributions. First, by focusing on party 
and candidate evaluations, it adds another dimension to the literature on what differentiates 
attitudes directed at parties from attitudes directed at candidates. Second, it makes a theoretical 
contribution by introducing concepts from social psychology not previously used in the political 
attitude literature. Third, it explores the research question in two empirical studies. The first is to 
my knowledge the first experimental study which compares party and candidate evaluations. The 
second examines the question in a dynamic campaign setting, using a Bayesian learning model 
as an “accounting device” to estimate the use of old and new information in party and candidate 
evaluations, and the extent to which new information is subject to partisan bias (Bartels 1993: 
268) 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
In answering this question, the thesis will make several contributions to the litearure. First, by 
focusing on party and candidate evaluations, it adds another dimension to the literature on what 
differentiates attitudes directed at parties from attitudes directed at candidates. Second, it makes 
a theoretical contribution by introducing concepts from social psychology not previously used in 
the political attitude literature. Third, it explores the research question in two empirical studies. 
The first is to my knowledge the first experimental study which compares party and candidate 
evaluations. The second examines the question in a dynamic campaign setting, using a Bayesian 
learning model as an “accounting device” to estimate the use of old and new information in party 
and candidate evaluations, and the extent to which new information is subject to partisan bias 




1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is made up of four chapters in addition to this one. Chapter two presents the 
theoretical framework which provides the foundation for the hypotheses to be tested in the 
ensuing chapters. It begins by presenting the classical approaches to political attitudes, and 
considers their limitations in relation to the research question. Since they view attitudes as direct 
responses to socio-political phenomena, they are insufficiently sensitive to the cognitive 
processes involved in attitude formation. I argue that evaluations are summary judgements 
associatively linked in memory with an attitude object, and that the association between the 
attitude and the object can fluctuate in degree of accessibility. I introduce a theoretical 
framework developed by Hamilton and Sherman (1996: 336) to explain why forming attitudes 
towards individual persons and groups “engage different mechanisms for processing information 
and making judgements.” In adapting this framework to party and candidate evaluations, I claim 
that party evaluations less responsive to new information than candidate evaluations. Moreover, I 
consider how the dynamic involved in party and candidate evaluations it interacts with partisan 
motivated reasoning. On this basis, I present the proposition that candidate evaluations are less 
susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations.  
Chapter three tests this proposition through a survey experiment conducted on a representative 
sample of Norwegian citizens. The experiment is designed to portray attitude formation during a 
political campaign leading up to a municipal election in Norway. By exposing respondents to the 
same information, and manipulating the target of that information, it is shown that candidate 
evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations. However, this is a double 
edged sword. While respondents evaluating out-group targets are more responsive to new 
information about individual candidates than parties, respondents evaluating in-group targets are 
also more responsive to negative information about candidates than parties. This fits with the 
impression that candidate-centered voting is more volatile than party-centered voting. 
Chapter four explores party and candidate evaluations during the run-up to the 2017 German 
federal election. The purpose of this chapter is to explore party and candidate evaluations in a 
dynamic information environment. Rather than examining the effects of specific pieces of 
information, it examines the overall effects of information on party and candidate evaluations. 
That is, it examines the use of information in party and candidate evaluations whilst remaining 
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agnostic about the quality and quantity of that information. Accordingly, the chapter is less 
concerned with pinning down the cognitive micro-processes involved in attitude formation than 
mapping out a broader picture of the use of information during a political campaign. In so doing, 
it uses a Bayesian learning model as an “accounting device” to estimate the use of old and new 
information in party and candidate evaluations, and the extent to which new information is 
subject to partisan bias (Bartels 1993: 268). The results corroborates the main finding from 
chapter 3, that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations.  
The final chapter sums up the findings of the previous chapters, and suggests avenues for future 
research. It is concluded that the two empirical studies provide strong support for the proposition 





































We relate to individuals in a different way than we relate to collective entities. As the attention of 
voters shifts from parties to candidates, this should be accounted for in the theory of political 
attitudes. In this chapter, I introduce the conceptual framework developed by Hamilton and 
Sherman to explain differences in perceptions of individuals and groups, and make a case for its 
relevance in the study of political attitudes. I begin by identifying limitations in traditional 
approaches to political attitudes. I argue that they are insufficiently sensitive to the role of 
cognitive limitations in attitude formation, and therefore overlook important considerations that 
influence how evaluations are formed and change over time. One of these is what is known as 
entitativity, meaning the degree to which the attitude object appears as a discrete and coherent 
entity. In adapting this concept to the political context, I consider how it interacts with partisan 
motivated reasoning. Based on this discussion, I propose that candidate evaluations are less 
susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations. 
 
2.1 Theories of attitude formation 
Political scientists tend to view evaluations as direct responses to socio-political phenomena. 
Accordingly, attitudes towards specific objects are viewed as incidental to their position in the 
political context. That is, party and candidate evaluations are not evaluations of parties and 
candidates as such, but responses to socio political variables. In this section, I present the social 
identity and rational choice perspectives traditionally used to explain political attitude formation 




2.1.1 The Social Identity perspective 
According to the social identity perspective, political attitudes result from citizens’ fundamental 
need to cultivate social relationships. Put simply, people are first and foremost social beings who 
“think of themselves as members of a group, attach emotional significance to their membership 
and adjust their behaviour to conform to group norms” (Bartle & Bellucci, 2009: 5). The impulse 
to seek acceptance from the social group is therefore a catalyst for a broad range of behavior, 
including attitude formation. The comparatively obstruce project of making sense of the wider 
world is an appendage to this overriding impulse. Opinions about politics, for most people a 
remote subject, is subsumed under the need to cultivate relationships with family, neighbours, 
colleagues and other individuals they interact with on a regular basis (Bartle & Bellucci 2009; p. 
8). 
 
According to the most influential iteration of social identity theory, the so-called Michigan 
model, the impulse to seek membership of a social group is in the political realm serviced by the 
political party. Accordingly, party identification is the primary determinant of political attitudes 
(Campbell et al.1960). Specifically, party identification acts as a “perceptual screen through 
which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation.” (Campbell et al. 
1960: 133). Thus: 
 
[P]arty has a profound influence across the full range of political objects to which the 
individual voter responds. The strength of relationship between party identification and 
the dimensions of partisan attitude suggests that responses to each element of national 
politics are deeply affected by the individual’s enduring partisan attachments. (Campbell 
et al. 1960, p. 128) 
 
As this excerpt makes clear, party identification is not simply an attitude directed at the party 
itself, but an “organizing device for the voters’ political evaluations and judgements” (Dalton, 
2000: 20). This includes evaluations and judgements directed at individual candidates. As 




[A] party undoubtedly furnishes a powerful set of cues about a political leader just by 
nominating him for President. Merely associating the party symbol with his name 
encourages those identifying with the party to develop a more favorable image of his 
record and experience, his abilities, and his other personal attributes. (Campbell et al., 
1960: p. 128).  
 
Amongst its defining characteristics, party identification is stable over time. It is formed in 
childhood or early adulthood, and persists until death, or a radical change in life situation triggers 
a move between social groups. It is essentially a “prepolitical attitude” (Johnston, 2006: 329), 
and is rarely influenced by ongoing political events. Party identities, as Bartels (2002: 117) puts 
it, are the “unmoved movers of more specific political attitudes and behavior” (Bartels, 2002: 
117). In stark terms, party identification can be seen as “an exogenous variable affecting politics 
but not being affected by politics” (Holmberg, 2007, p. 563).  
 
According to the Michigan model, then, a person’s attitudes towards a particular object is 
incidental to that object’s position within the social structure. That is, attitude change is not a 
function of the properties of the attitude object, but proceeds from changes in the social cleavage 
structure, or the subject’s position within it. Since attitudes towards different political objects 
emanate from the same source (party identification), comparing attitude formation across objects 
is not an immediate concern. Campbell and colleagues' own discussion on the difference 
between party and candidate evaluations is instructive in this regard. They recognized that 
feelings towards political parties are not perfect correlates of attitudes towards their candidates, 
and that the latter in some cases could determine election outcomes independently of the 
former.  However, these outlier cases were treated as “idiosyncratic short-term forces” (Miller et 
al. 1986: 522) . Thus, “the [Michigan model] provides no theoretical principle to guide 
investigation of the content of candidate image that is not apparently a product of this partisan 
screening process” (Brown et al. 1988: 730). It does not explain how or why party and candidate 
evaluations differ, even if it suggests that they do. 
 
 
2.1.2 The rational choice perspective 
Social identity theory was well placed to explain the stable class-based cleavage structures of the 
US postwar era. However, volatile voting behavior and new forms of political involvement from 
the 1960s onwards cast doubt on its ability to provide a comprehensive explanation of voting 
behavior. It soon became clear that partisanship should not after all be understood as a stable 
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identity, but is in fact malleable and responsive to political events. It was understood that 
“[p]arty identification is shaping behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions at the same time as it is 
shaped by attitudes and perceptions” (Holmberg, 2007, p. 562).  
 
Around the same time, European scholars argued that party identification could not account for 
voting behavior in multiparty systems, where voters regularly moved between parties and 
evidently felt a measure of partisan attachment towards multiple parties at once (Pappi, 1996). 
Claims of this nature suggested that a scalar conception of partisanship was more appropriate 
than the binary in/out group model suggested by social identity theory. For this reason, some 
scholars argued that partisanship should be understood as a positive or negative dispositional 
like/dislike attitude like any other (Converse 1995; Garzia, 2013).  
 
In the 1970s, a group of “revisionists” openly questioned the Michigan-model's nonpolitical 
conception of partisanship, emphasising the role of cognitive factors in shaping political attitudes 
(Fiorina: 1981). This cognitive turn is often associated with rational choice theories which 
postulate that dispositional attitudes are the result of rational assessments of political events. That 
is to say, attitudes are based on “ideas about the way the world is, the way the world should be 
and the chief means of getting from one to the other” (Bartle & Bellucci 2009: 14). The 
paradigmatic example of this tradition is the Downsian spatial model, which represents voting 
decisions as a choice between policy options spread along a left-right axis (Downs 1957). In this 
model, issue proximity is the basis of voters’ attitudes towards parties or politicians (Garzia 
2014: 26). Other models in this tradition base attitude formation on retrospective performance 
evaluations (Fiorina: 1981) and prospective competence assessments (Bellucci 2006), but the 
underlying principle is the same. 
 
Like the social identity perspective, rational choice theory is insufficiently sensitive to the role of 
attitude objects in shaping the dynamics of attitude formation. What matters is not what type of 
object is under consideration, but its perceived association with some desired outcome. In stark 
terms, voters do not evaluate politicians or parties, but the policy outcomes they represent. As 
Lodge and colleagues (1990: 10) put it, “Candidates [or parties] are viewed as alternative policy 
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choices open to the voter”. From the rational choice perspective, the lack of interest in the role of 
different attitude objects in shaping the process of attitude formation can therefore be explained 
by the fact that it is simply not the kind of thing a rational voter would worry about. It does not 
matter whether the attitude object is a party or candidate as long as it delivers the desirable 
results. If social identity theory is insufficiently cognitive, rational choice theory errs in the 
opposite direction.  
 
2.1.3 Attitude strength and symbolic attitudes in party and leader evaluations 
Although the classical formulations of social identity and rational choice theory does not provide 
a theoretical framework for the comparison of party and candidate evaluation, the perennial 
debate between the two has proved fruitful in this regard. In particular, efforts have been made to 
explain the stability of party attitudes projected by the Michigan model, whilst recognizing that 
such attitudes should not be understood as dichotomous in/out-group identities, but as 
evaluations – that is, like and dislike not unlike attitudes directed at other objects. In this context, 
it has been argued that attitudes towards parties “may be stronger than those associated with 
other objects”, and are therefore “likely to have some of the same consequences as identities” 
(Bartle & Bellucci 2009: 5). That is, they “will endure, will resist attempts at persuasion in 
contrary directions, will exert influence on formation of related perceptions and beliefs, and ‒ 
perhaps most important ‒ will predict behavioral decisions with highest fidelity” (Converse 
1995: xi). If attitudes directed at parties are systematically stronger than attitudes directed at 
individual candidates, the dynamics of attitude formation should differ in party and candidate 
evaluations. This perspective may be articulated within both the rational choice and social 
identity frameworks.  
 
In the rational choice tradition, the logic of retrospective evaluations provides an intuitive 
explanation of the stability of partisan attitudes. As we learn more information about an object, 
our attitude towards it become more accurate, and therefore a more precise reflections of our 
personal interests. New information is therefore less likely to result in attitude change. This basic 
idea has been formalized in Bayesian learning models which explain attitude change as a 
function of the precision of new information and the strength of prior beliefs (Gerber & Green 
1998; Bullock 2009). In such models, parties may be expected to generate particularly strong 
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priors due to the prevalence and accessibility of information about them. As Bartle and Bellucci 
(2009: 17) put it:  
 
Since parties dominate every level of government, have associations with many social 
groups, take positions on a range of issues and structure the terms of the political debate, 
it seems only too reasonable to infer that voters have pre-formed attitudes towards these 
objects.  
 
Within the social identity tradition, early socialization provides an explanation of the strength of 
partisan attitudes. Sears (1983) formulates a version of this argument through the concept of 
symbolic and non-symbolic attitudes. Whereas nonsymbolic attitudes “change easily in response 
to persuasive arguments and to changes in the objective political world”, symbolic attitudes are 
stable beliefs formed early in life through a “conditioning-like process” (Krosnick 1991: 548). 
He further proposes a hierarchy of symbolic attitudes, ranging from highly symbolic to non-
symbolic with party identification being the most symbolic.1  Although Sears’ model does not 
include explicit provision for attitudes directed at individual politicians, the fact that such 
attitudes are rarely formed early in life suggests that they are comparatively non-symbolic.  
 
There are obvious empirical differences between these perspectives. In particular, the 
retrospective evaluations model hypothesizes volatile partisan attitudes in inexperienced young 
adults, whereas symbolic attitudes are thought to be inherited from parents very early in life. 
However, one important proposition is shared by both: attitudes towards parties are less 
responsive to new information than attitudes towards other objects, and tend to be more stable 
over time. This is in line with the hypotheses to be tested in this thesis. However, as it stands, the 
theoretical framework is somewhat unsatisfying. As Krosnick (1991: 571) notes, “focusing on 
the attitude object may not be the most effective way to distinguish strong attitudes from weak 
ones. Any given political attitude is likely to be strong among some individuals and weak among 
 
1 The full hierarchy: (1) political party identification, (2) liberal-conservative ideological orientation, (3) attitudes 
toward social groups, (4) attitudes on racial policy issues, (5) attitudes on nonracial policy issues, and (6) attitudes 




others.” Many factors may influence the strength of people’s attitudes towards particular object 
types. For example, it is likely that attitudes towards parties are less strong in multi-party 
systems, such as in Germany and Norway, in which voters regularly vote for different parties, 
than in the US two-party system. Moreover, the process of personalization may be understood 
precisely as a waning of the strength of attitudes towards parties in relation to attitudes directed 
at candidates, in which case the claim that attitude strength provides an explanation of systematic 
differences in attitudes towards parties in relation to other objects mistakes historical 
contingency for law. 
 
More pressingly, understanding party identification as a particularly strong attitude confounds 
two analytically distinct concepts: the sense of belonging to a group, and the psychological 
phenomenon of feeling a like or dislike towards an attitude object. This distinction is clearly 
illustrated by the fact that a sense of shared identity with an attitude object is compatible with a 
feeling of dislike towards it, just as it is possible to like an object identified with another group. 
As Greene (2002: 184) explains: 
 
While there is undoubtedly a correlation between the value of one’s group membership 
and a positive attitude toward a party, they are distinct psychological concepts. One can 
imagine giving a party a high score without actually belonging, much as one might give a 
high feeling thermometer rating to “Blacks” or “poor people” without being a member of 
either group. 
 
Party identity should therefore not be understood in terms of evaluations, but as a sense of group 
membership which interacts with the cognitive processes involved in forming evaluations of 
political objects, including the party itself. This distinction, therefore, is crucial, and this thesis 
examines candidate and party evaluations in the context of in and out-group attitudes. 
Specifically, it explores whether candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than 
party evaluations. To this end, we need a theoretical framework which explains how the 
processes involved in evaluating parties and candidates interact with party identities. In what 
follows, I propose a theoretical framework which explains differences in party and candidate 
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evaluations based on the properties of the attitude object, and the psychological processes 
involved in forming attitudes about them.  
 
2.2 The information processing perspective 
Attitude formation involves complex cognitive processes that are influenced by a large number 
of factors. One of these is the perceived entitativity of the attitude object, meaning the degree to 
which it is perceived as abstract or concrete.  In this section I present the cognitive psychology 
perspective on attitude formation before introducing the concept of entitativity and its us in the 
study of evaluations of groups and individuals. 
 
2.2.1 Attitudes as “pictures in the head” 
The theoretical perspective to be developed in the remainder of this chapter proceeds from an 
important shortcoming in the social identity and rational choice theories of attitude formation. At 
first glance, these perspectives seem polar opposites. The former claims that citizens 
unconsciously inherit attitudes from their immediate social surroundings, whilst the latter claims 
that attitudes are arrived at consciously, through rational deliberation. Despite these differences, 
however, they are both examples of what Lodge and colleagues (1990: 5) call “memory based 
models”. Although they present different accounts of how information is transformed into 
attitudes, both assume that once received, information is easily stored in memory for seamless 
retrieval at the time of attitude formation. That is to say, they do not “explain how citizens 
actually go about recalling remembered information, or choosing what information to recall, or 
how recalled information gets integrated into a summary judgment” (Lodge et al. 1990: 13). This 
is done mechanically, through a “perceptual screen” in the one case, and rational deliberation in 
the other. Both perspectives are therefore based on “black-box (stimulus in, response out) models 
of choice: campaign events in, recollections and evaluations out” (Lodge et al. 1990: 13).  
 
In political science, the idea that attitude formation is subject to cognitive limitations is usually 
attributed to Walter Lippmann, who noted that “(t)he world that we have to deal with politically 
is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported and imagined” 
(Lippmann, 2009: 336). His key insight was that the unavoidable tasks of exploring, reporting 
and imagining which underlie attitude formation are cognitively taxing, and involve a mix of 
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conscious and unconscious mental processes. Information about “the world outside” (Lippmann: 
2009, 323) is not accessed directly, but passes through imperfect cognitive processes on its way 
to attitude formation. This truism from psychology, which began its cognitive revolution in the 
1950s, has been slow to catch on amongst political scientists who prefer to view political 
attitudes as direct responses to meso and macro-political phenomena (t’ Hart 2010: 102). As Lau 
and Redlawsk (2006: 21) note, however, “there is nothing special about the political environment 
that should cause people to overcome magically the limitations of human cognition.” 
 
In Lippman’s (2009: 323) enduring words, the process of forming attitudes towards political 
objects begins with an attempt to represent them as “pictures in our heads”. In contemporary 
terminology, the notion of a mental image is better understood as a network of information (or 
nodes) connected to the attitude object via neural pathways. The mention of a particular 
politician triggers associations with other affectively laden objects stored in memory, such as 
“conservative”, “incompetent”, “abortion”, etc., which together produce an emotional response 
(Berent & Krosnick 1995: 95). Accordingly, “an attitude” is defined as a “summary evaluation 
that is associatively linked in memory with the object of that evaluation” (Ferguson & Fukukura, 
2012: 166).  
 
This definition is sensitive to the cognitively demanding processes involved in information 
storage and retrieval. Far from a mechanical process, attitude formation is “the result of a 
dynamic process involving the building of some construct”, and “reflects the perceiver’s effort to 
impose structure on the assortment of facts that he or she has received” (McGraw & 
Steenbergen, 1995: 16). As McGraw (2003: 398) explains: 
 
Impression formation is [...] a dynamic, constructive process, evolving over time. New 
information is incorporated, and impressions are systematically, and sometimes not so 
systematically, revised. These revisions can occur at a slow, imperceptible pace, or they 
can be dramatic and palpable (left-leaning readers might consider their impressions of 




The processes underlying attitude formation depends on the particulars of the cognitive task, and 
as McGraw’s example shows, it can be of immense political consequence. Clearly, it is in the 
interest of political science to get a handle on the dynamics that govern them. 
 
2.2.2 The concept of entitativity 
“Black box” models are not sensitive to differences in the cognitive processes involved in 
evaluations of different attitude objects. Positive and negative inputs are transformed into 
summary judgements in exactly the same way irrespective of whether the target is a party or a 
candidate. However, the information processing perspective just presented provides the outlines 
of the central proposition to be developed in this section: constructing a mental image of a party 
is not the same as constructing a mental image of a party leader, and it involves a different set of 
cognitive processes.  
 
This proposition proceeds from the concept of entitativity, meaning “the degree of being 
entitative. The degree of having the nature of an entity, of having real existence” (Campbell 
1960: 190). Put differently, entitativity relates to the degree to which an attitude object appears to 
the perceiver as a coherent and unified whole. This influences how information is integrated into 
a summary judgment. Consider the example of forming an impression of a jazz orchestra: 
 
It is true that some of the data reported by human organs seem more substantial than 
others. One sees a saxophone and hears the atmospheric disturbances to which it gives 
rise, but one cannot see or hear or touch or smell the group relationships which in some 
perplexing manner bind the members of the jazz orchestra together. The first surmise that 
each member is wholly independent of the others in thought and action eventually breaks 
down, and it is perceived that they have organization, but the organization seems less 
tangible than the saxophone (Rice 1928, in Campbell 1960: 188) 
 
The orchestra offers clues about its nature, as does the saxophone, but these are of a very 





More in line with the themes of this thesis, Hamilton and Sherman (1996: 336) used the concept 
of entitativity to demonstrate that forming attitudes towards individual persons and groups 
“engage different mechanisms for processing information and making judgements.” They 
observed that a person is generally “expected to be an organized entity; he or she is the same 
person, with the same personality, yesterday, today, and tomorrow” (Hamilton & Sherman 1996: 
337). The perceiver therefore expects a high level of conformity in the traits and behavior of 
individual persons, and “strives to capture this unity during the process of forming an 
impression.” (Hamilton & Sherman 1996: 337). Given this assumption of unity, any new 
information about the individual’s traits and behavior is taken to “reflect the target person's 
inherent nature or essence, the main themes of his or her personality.” If this information is 
inconsistent with prior beliefs, it will be met with a conscious effort to generate a coherent, up-
to-date attitude. Accordingly, attitude formation about individual targets is associated with 
integrative, or online, information processing characterized by general responsiveness to new 
information. 
 
When confronted with expectation-inconsistent information about an individual person, we are 
prompted to think along the following lines: "Hey, what's going on here? Why did she do that? 
That doesn't fit with my impression of her at all." (Hamilton & Sherman 1996: 338). Unexpected 
information about a group, however, is unlikely to induce a response like this, in part because it 
is far from obvious that groups are purposive entities capable of doing things. Thinking of a 
group as a causal agent involves the complex cognitive process of attribution,  whereby a person 
is seen as acting on behalf of others. Thus people rarely explain group behavior in terms of 
agentive reasons, relying instead on causal histories of reasons; “factors that preceded and 
brought about the agent’s reason” (O’Laughlin & Malle 2002: 33). Whilst certain conditions 
facilitate social attribution, such as perceived similarity amongst group members (Yzerbyt et al. 
1998), it is generally the case that people do not “expect the same degree of unity and coherence 
among members of a group as they expect in the personality of an individual person” (Hamilton 
& Sherman 1996: 339).  
 
Because individuals are less likely to view groups as internally consistent units, they have greater 
tolerance for expectation-inconsistent information about them, and less motivation to integrate 
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such information into a summary judgment. As a result, attitude formation about group targets is 
less responsive to new information, and is less likely to be updated on-line. Instead, it is 
retrospective in that it is based on schematic information stored in memory, so-called 
stereotypes. In short, “concrete entities allow for more flexible, context-dependent judgements 
whereas abstract entities are more likely to be judged by context insensitive precomputed 
expectancies.” (Sherman et al. 2015: 243).  
 
2.3 Party and candidate evaluations 
The role of entitativity in the formation of attitudes towards groups and individuals is well 
documented. However, parties are particular types of groups, and candidates particular kinds of 
individuals. This section applies the concept of entitativity to the political context. First, I 
considers previous use of entitativity and related concepts in the political science literature. 
Then, I review the separate literatures on party and candidate evaluations and consider whether 
previous research is consistent with expectations based on the theory of entitativity. Finally, I 
make the case for applying the concept to party and candidate evaluations. In so doing, the role 
of partisan motivated reasoning must be accounted for.  
 
2.3.1 Entitativity and related concepts in the political science literature 
The concept of entitativity is not entirely without precedent in the political science literature. 
Lodge and Taber (2005: 457) have previously considered the possibility that entitativity impacts 
on the automaticity of attitude formation about political issues, presidential candidates and 
political groups (Lodge & Taber 2005). Furthermore, McGraw and Ling (2003) citing Hamilton 
and Sherman’s research, conducted an experiment which shows that evaluations of an individual 
candidate (Bill Clinton) are more responsive to information effects than evaluations of political 
groups (feminists). Similarly, Riggle (1992) found that citizens use an integrative mode of 
information processing when evaluating a single candidate, but turned to a heuristic strategy 
when evaluating two candidates. Moreover, a similar concept has been applied to policy 
evaluations, which is said to trigger a cognitively complex process of weighing pros and cons, 
preventing the voter from forming a summative judgement (Zaller & Feldman 1992). As 
McGraw explains, the number of independent dimensions underlying the attitude is relevant for 
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the formation of that attitude, with more complex information processing tasks being associated 
with moderate attitudes (McGraw, 2002).  
 
In the present case, the application of entitativity is based on the following reasoning: political 
parties, like other groups, are neither seen nor heard, and must be inferred from the traits and 
behaviors of individuals that represent them. These are not always coherent, and integrating a 
variety of information about a party into a summary judgement is more cumbersome than doing 
the same for an individual politician. Accordingly, it is expected that candidate evaluations 
involve an integrative style of information processing, while party evaluations are more reliant 
on schemas stored in memory. Some tentative support for the theory may be found in the 
literatures on the dynamics of party and leader/candidate evaluations. Just as research on the 
perceptions of individuals and groups had followed two distinct paths before Hamilton and 
Sherman brought them together under a single theoretical framework, research on attitudes 
towards parties and candidates has been largely separate fields of inquiry within the political 
science literature, and relies on different conceptual tools.  
 
2.3.2 Party and leader evaluations in the literature 
Of the two, the literature on candidate evaluations makes the most frequent use of information 
processing perspectives. In line with expectations derived from the theory of entitativity, a series 
of experiments conducted by Lodge and colleagues demonstrates that candidate evaluations are 
largely formed online, with voters “spontaneously culling the affective value from each specific 
candidate message, and immediately integrating these assessments into a "running tally" that 
holds the individual's summary evaluation of the candidate” (Lodge et al. 1995: 310-311; see 
also McGraw et al. 1990; Lodge 1995; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, 
and Brau 1995; Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1990). Although this literature does not compare 
candidate evaluations with evaluations of parties, and rarely considers other attitude objects, it is 
frequently noted that the findings may be particular to the case of candidate evaluations. For 
example, Redlawsk (2006: 88) notes that it “appears clear that person-evaluation tasks, of which 
candidate evaluation certainly is one, are routinely processed online.”  Similarly, (Greene 2004: 
13) notes the possibility “that candidate evaluation is somehow unique and the dynamics and 
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media coverage of a political campaign favor online processing in a way that does not occur for 
ordinary political attitudes.” 
 
While studies on candidate evaluations have focused on psychological micro-processes, the vast 
literature on party attitudes is characterized by more conventional approaches grounded in social 
identity and rational choice theory. Although determining the impact of information effects on 
party attitudes has been a major aim, this has mainly been done through observational studies 
which rely on indirect measures of information effects such as performance assessments (Fiorina 
1981; Franklin & Jackson 1983; Gerber & Green 1998). Moreover, different conceptualizations 
of party attitudes (including thermometer ratings, ideological proximity and performance 
assessments to name a few) display vastly different levels of responsiveness to information 
effects (Green & Baltes 2017). Although some experimental studies examine information effects 
in controlled environments, these have focused on party identification rather than evaluations 
(Lupu 2013; Green & Pande 2012). Accordingly, the results cannot be directly compared with 
candidate evaluations. All in all, the literatures are too diverse to draw any conclusions about 
differences or similarities in party and candidate evaluations, or whether the empirical patterns 
are in line with expectations based on the theory of entitativity.  
 
 
2.3.3 Entitativity and partisan motivated reasoning 
Early research on entitativity and attitude formation was conducted in heavily controlled 
experimental contexts where the profiles of the individual and group targets under evaluation 
were designed to be as neutral as possible. In a political context, however, it cannot be assumed 
that the perceiver is a neutral observer. As Leeper and Slothuus (2014: 130) note, “political 
psychology cannot be understood without an account of partisan psychology”. Evidently, groups 
are perceived differently from outside than from within, and members of one’s own group are 
viewed with greater charity than members of a rival group. An account of how the singularity 
effect impacts on attitude formation in the context of electoral competition must therefore 




As noted above, the Michigan model conceptualizes such tendencies through the concept of 
party identity, which acts as a “perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what 
is favorable to his partisan orientation” (Campbell et al. 1960: 133). However, as Lodge and 
colleagues (1991, 1371) explain: 
 
The notion of a ‘perceptual screen’ is a rather static and limited view of cognitive 
processes. The metaphor of a screen suggests that some information passes through while 
other information does not, and it focuses our attention on the acquisition of information 
while ignoring its storage and retrieval from memory.  
 
As a cognitively informed alternative, Taber and Lodge (2006) suggests the theory of motivated 
reasoning. It proceeds from the premise that all attitude formation is goal oriented. Although one 
can have many goals, they  focus on two broad categories; “accuracy goals” motivate individuals 
to “seek out and carefully consider relevant evidence so as to reach a correct or otherwise best 
solution,” and “directional goals” motivate them to “apply their reasoning powers in defense of 
prior, specific conclusions” (2006: 756). Concretely, directional goals imbue partisans with the 
twin impulses to place greater weight on evidence which confirms prior beliefs, whilst also de-
emphasizing disconfirming evidence which challenges them (Lodge & Taber 2006).  
 
There is little doubt that both party and candidate evaluation are subject to partisan motivated 
reasoning. Parties, being the object of partisan association, are obviously seen through partisan 
lenses, but there is also ample evidence that directional goals play a considerable role in 
candidate evaluations. For example, Redlawsk (2002: 1022) finds that "candidate evaluation may 
be more about reinforcing existing feelings about candidates than about revising them in the face 
of new information”. Rahn (1993) also finds clear evidence that partisan cues facilitate 
stereotypical assessments of candidates, triggering a retrospective mode of attitude formation. 
However, a closer examination of how these information processing biases interact with the 
information processing strategies associated with entitativity provides several reasons to expect 
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candidate evaluations to be less susceptible to partisan motivated reasoning than party 
evaluations. 
 
In general, intergroup interactions tend to be more hostile and competitive than interindividual 
interactions, and are therefore strongly influenced by directional goals in attitude formation (see 
Wildschut et al. 2003 for review). Moreover, this tendency is enhanced when in and out-groups 
are perceived as united by a common purpose. This is facilitated by several factors typical to 
political parties, such as procedural interdependence (meaning there is “an interrelationship of 
group members' behavior and outcomes”2 (Wildschut et al. 2003 259)), and the use of flags and 
logos to signify group affiliation (Callahan & Ledgerwood 2016). These factors enhance the 
perceived entitativity of the group, and in neutral circumstances would promote an integrative 
style of information processing, as unexpected information forces a reconsideration of existing 
beliefs. However, in the context of partisan motivated reasoning, the perception of a group as 
homogeneous instead provides an impetus to exclude information which challenge directional 
goals. As Lewis and Sherman (2010: 213) explain, “(b)y classifying a negative in-group member 
as a “bad example” (or the "black-sheep" of the group), individuals can justify excluding the 
deviant member from the overall group evaluation.” 
 
Similarly, positive information about an out-group may easily be explained away as an exception 
to the rule (Rothbart & Park 2003). In contrast, behaviors that fit with the observer’s negative 
perception is readily attributed to the group as a whole, further confirming existing beliefs. In 
effect, the already complicated process of social attribution involved in party evaluations is 
easily captured by (dis)confirmation bias. Although this idea can be formulated using the concept 
of entitativity and motivated reasoning, it is also common sense.  It is captured by the following 
quote by Albert Einstein: 
 
 




If my theory of relativity is proven successful, Germany will claim me as a German and 
France will declare me a citizen of the world. Should my theory prove untrue, France will 
say that I am a German, and Germany will declare that I am a Jew. 
 
The quote speaks to the ease with which a collective and abstract entity may be disassociated 
from information which goes against the directional goals of the perceiver, or associated with 
information that affirms them. This is not as easily done when evaluating an individual person. 
Moreover the fact that the individual can be dissociated as a strategy to hold on to stereotype 
judgement, is clearly an important difference between party and candidate evaluations.  This 
suggests that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan motivated reasoning than 
party evaluations. This is the proposition to be tested in the ensuing chapters of thesis.   
 
2.3.4 Entitativity and the malleability of party and leader images 
Before moving on to the empirical chapters, one important caveat to the theory must be 
addressed. The recognition that political attitudes are unreliably constructed mental images has 
far reaching consequences. Crucially, it questions the core idea that attitude formation is a 
function of the attitude object. If political attitudes are not direct effects of “the world out there”, 
but are influenced by a variety of cognitive processes, they are in part subjective, and therefore 
malleable. After all, “different ways of thinking about politics can lead to different ways of 
relating to politics” (Garzia, 2014: p. 41). At the extreme, this disconnect between attitude 
objects and their representation in the imagination of voters is associated with the assertion that 
elections are “entirely about image not reality” (in Davies & Mian 2010: 332).  
 
This invokes the idea that attitudes are somehow arbitrary and that their formation is not subject 
to empirical regularities. Perhaps more concerning, it can be taken to suggest that they are 
susceptible to deliberate “impression management” (McGraw 2003: 409). The proliferation of 
political advertising and spin suggests that this is at least partly true. More relevant to the present 
case, several studies suggest that parties are increasingly leveraging the malleability of their own 
image in efforts to adapt to an increasingly personalized politics, for example by employing 
leader-centered campaign strategies (Farrell and Webb, 2000). Given this, it has been suggested 
that voters are not in fact shifting their attention away from political parties, but are instead 
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associating the parties more closely with their leaders (Midtbø 1997; Garzia 2013). Thus 
understood, personalization is not premised on a party/leader dichotomy, according to which one 
gains prominence at the expense of the other. Instead, party leaders are increasingly 
“personifying the policy platforms of their respective parties” (McAllister 2007, p. 574). As 
Garzia (...: 19) notes, “[t]he ever more evident overlap between the image of the party and the 
image of the leader has eventually blurred the contour between the two”. On the face of it, the 
malleability of party and candidate images calls into question the idea that they are analytically 
distinct categories that citizens evaluate in systematically different ways. 
 
This is an important caveat to the ability of the theory of entitativity to explain differences in 
party and candidate evaluations. Entitativity does not in fact refer to the objective reality of the 
attitude object, but how it is constructed in the mind of the perceiver. This is influenced by 
several factors. For example, groups that are formed with a clear goal in mind, such as an 
orchestra, are generally perceived as having a higher degree of entitativity than haphazardly 
formed groups, like a random selection of people waiting at a bus-stop (Lickel et al. 2000). 
Similarly, a party which is associated closely with its leader is likely to be viewed as more 
entitative than a party with a less hierarchical structure. In an experiment drawing on the 
entitativity literature, McGraw and Dolan (2007) found that associating states are evaluated 
using on-line information processing strategies when associated with their political leader, 
whereas describing a state as a parliamentary institution produces weaker attitudes and memory-
based information processing. This is likely the case in party evaluations as well. However, 
examining the conditions that influence the perceived entitativity of a political party is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. It proceeds on the assumption that parties in general are perceived as less 
entitative than individual candidates. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The social identity and rational choice theories traditionally used to explain political attitudes are 
not equipped to account for differences in party and candidate evaluations. Since they treat 
political attitudes as direct consequences of sociopolitical phenomena, they fail to take account 
of the crucial role of cognitive processes in attitude formation. The concept of entitativity is a 
valuable addition to the literature, and can improve our understanding of political attitudes. This 
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Party and candidate evaluations in a Norwegian 
municipal election                                                  




In the personalization literature, it is often claimed that individual candidates have an advantage 
over collective entities like parties in their ability to reach across partisan divides and appeal to 
new voters. This claim is mainly used as an explanation of the ongoing process of 
personalization, and is rarely treated as a phenomenon to be examined in its own right. The 
theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter provides the starting point for such an 
inquiry. Through a survey experiment conducted on a representative sample of Norwegian 
citizens, this chapter shows that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than 
party evaluations. However, this is a double-edged sword. While respondents evaluating out-
group targets were more responsive to positive information about individual candidates than 
parties, respondents evaluating in-group targets were also more responsive to negative 
information about candidates than parties. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the hypothesis and justify the case selection. I 
then present the research design, and explain the experimental procedure. Finally, I present and 
analyze the results, which support the proposition that candidate evaluations are less susceptible 





3.1 Hypotheses and case selection 
The theory presented in the previous chapter provides the basis for testable hypotheses about 
differences between party and candidate evaluations. In this section, I present two hypotheses 
which suggest that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than leader 
evaluations. These hypotheses are supplemented with an ancillary exploration of gender effects 
in candidate evaluations, also presented in this section. Finally, I suggest some advantages of 
testing the hypotheses on a representative sample of Norwegian citizens.   
 
3.1.1 Hypotheses 
Attitudes are made up of two related, but analytically distinct elements. Impressions are mental 
representations consisting of one’s “knowledge and beliefs” about an object (McGraw 2012: 
187). That is, impressions are information stored in memory about some attitude object. The 
second element is evaluations. Evaluations are negative or positive dispositions associated with 
an attitude object, usually thought of as summary judgements of impressions stored in memory 
(McGraw 2012). 
Intuitively, party and candidate impressions differ in important ways. When forming an 
impression of an individual person, we rely on characteristics not typically applied to political 
parties, such as personality traits, appearance and competence assessments. As voters are 
growing more attuned to individual candidates, and increasingly base voting decisions on 
feelings towards them, the content of candidate impressions has become an important topic of 
research. In this context, it is sometimes argued focus on persons is focus turned away from 
politically salient topics associated with party images. Thus Adam and Maier (2010: 213) define 
personalization as a shift in “focus of politics from topics to people and from parties to 
politicians.” 
The differences between party and candidate evaluations has received less attention. As the 
previous chapter showed, they are not adequately accounted for in the traditional theories of 
political attitude formation. However, theoretical frameworks developed by social psychologists 
to explain differences in evaluations of individuals and groups may be of use. The previous 
chapter argued that the process whereby impressions are integrated into summary evaluations 




accordance with the theory of entitativity, party evaluations are less responsive to new 
information than candidate evaluations. 
The experimental method is the natural way to explore whether this is the case. It allows the 
researcher to hold the flow of information constant, and manipulate only the attitude object. 
Using this approach, McGraw and Ling (2003) observed that evaluations of an individual 
candidate (Bill Clinton) are more responsive to information effects than evaluations of political 
groups (feminists). This chapter extends this research in two important ways. First, it compares 
information effects on candidate and party evaluations, a dichotomy which is increasingly 
relevant given the ongoing process of personalization. Second, it explores whether the dynamics 
of party and candidate evaluations interact with partisan motivated reasoning. 
The theory proposed in the previous chapter suggests that party evaluations are more susceptible 
to partisan motivated reasoning than candidate evaluations. The abstract and collective nature of 
parties facilitates the disconfirmation of information which conflicts with partisan 
predispositions. Positive information about an out-group party may easily be explained away as 
an exception to the rule, and functionally excluded from the attitude formation. In contrast, the 
expectation of internal unity in individual targets promotes a more integrative style of 
information processing. The evaluator is prompted to come up with a story to explain how the 
new information coheres with the unified nature of the object (O’Laughlin & Malle 2002). 
Moreover, the possibility that individuals are treated as exceptions to the rule works in favor of 
the individual being evaluated, by allowing the evaluator to digest expectation-inconsistent 
messages without forfeiting their partisan predisposition. This provides the rationale of the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Evaluations of out-group candidates are more responsive to positive information 
than Evaluations of out-group parties. 
A similar dynamic is expected in evaluations of in-group targets, but in this case negative 
information is expected to impact candidate evaluations more than party evaluations. Just as the 
abstract and collective nature of parties facilitates a disconfirmation of unexpected positive 




attributed to a few bad apples in a process known as the “black sheep” effect (Lewis & Sherman 
2007). This same strategy can be used to explain negative information directed at an individual 
co-partisan, allowing the evaluator to form a negative evaluation without challenging their 
partisan predispositions. Accordingly: 
H2: Evaluations of in-group candidates are more responsive to negative information 
than evaluations of out-group parties. 
The information processing strategies associated with entitativity explains attitudinal responses 
to information which runs counter to previous beliefs. When confronted with information which 
confirms these, it is therefore unlikely that there will be substantial differences in party and 
candidate evaluations.  
 
3.1.2 Gender and partisan predispositions 
The process of personalization makes the characteristics of individual candidates more 
important. One characteristic that has been shown to have effects on candidate evaluations is 
gender (Smith et al, 2007). A claim which has received some support  holds that women are 
subject to a “backlash effect”; although they are rewarded with higher evaluations than men 
when subject to positive information, they are also punished more severely for transgressions 
(Rudman & Phelan  2008). In addition to the hypotheses presented above, this experiment will 
explore (1) whether there is a noticeable backlash effect in candidate evaluations in Norway and 
(2) whether it depends on in and out-group attitudes.  
 
3.1.3 The case of Norway 
The experiment portrays attitude formation during the run-up to a municipal election in Norway. 
Several considerations makes Norway a compelling case. First, the Norwegian political system 
promotes a perception of parties as highly entitative organizations, meaning Norway can be 
thought of as a least likely case. Norway has a multi-party system based on proportional 
representation and a stable party system. It is often said that systems based on proportional 
representation structures incentives in a way that promotes centrally organized and disciplined 
parties. This is true of Norway, where party organizations permeate the political process from 




constituency branches of the party organization (Valen et al. 2002). During election campaigns, 
candidates adhere to centralized party strategies (Karlsen & Skogerbø: 2015), and as elected 
officials they remain largely subservient to the party line (Sieberer 2006; Rasch ). Moreover, 
since candidates are elected through party lists, they are not incentivized to promote themselves 
individually or compete with party colleagues for the attention of voters (Karlsen & Skogerbø 
2015). Laver and Schofield’s (1990: 237) observation that Norwegian parties “function more as 
uni­tary actors than do those in most of the other West European systems” remains a fair 
description of the Norwegian party system to this day. In line with previous research which 
shows that unity of purpose increases the perceived entitativity of groups, it is therefore likely 
that Norwegian parties are viewed as high-entitativity organizations. In accordance with the 
theory, Norwegian citizens should therefore be fairly sensitive to new information about them, at 
least in comparison with party systems associated with higher degrees of intra-party pluralism. 
As such, Norway is a hard case for the theory, making results consistent with the hypotheses all 
the more compelling. 
The second reason Norway is a compelling case is its normalcy. Although the characteristics of 
Norwegian parliamentarism makes Norway a “least likely” case, it is not alone in this category. 
The characteristics just described are fairly unremarkable for parliamentary systems based on 
proportional representation. Cohesive parties are generally understood to be a consequence of 
such systems (Sieberer 2006). For the purpose of testing the theory, we can therefore think of 
Norway as a representative case.  
The third reason Norway is a compelling case has to do with the experimental design. For 
reasons to be explained below, the experiment portrays a process of attitude formation during a 
municipal election campaign. Although there are good reasons to be suspicious of attempts to 
attribute regularities observed at the local level to national politics, this may be done with some 
credibility in the Norwegian case. Norway is divided into 11 administrative counties which make 
up the constituencies for parliamentary and county elections. These counties are in turn divided 
into 356 municipalities, which serve as administrative units and as constituencies for local 
elections. National and local level elections are held interchangeably every two years. Although 
unique local parties exist, the national parties are dominant at the municipal level. Moreover, 




composition of the parliament” (Enli & Skogerbø 2013: 761).  During campaigns, local branches 
of national parties adhere to centralized campaign strategies, and front their own local issues 
within its confines (Karlsen and Skogerbø, forthcoming). Although local candidates often stress 
the importance of “localizing” campaigns, this typically means “‘translating’ the national 
campaign strategy to the regional or local level, not about independent local strategies” (Karlsen 
& Skogerbø 2015: 428). Accordingly, respondents are likely to identify the local branches of the 
parties closely with their national organizations, and evaluate them similarly. 
 
3.2 Research design 
The hypotheses are tested in a survey experiment conducted through a probability-based online 
survey. The experiment portrays the process of attitude formation about parties and candidates 
during a campaign leading up to a municipal election in Norway. In this section, explain the 
advantage of the experimental method, before presenting the experimental design used in this 
study. 
 
3.2.1 Experimental method 
Attitude formation is a complex psychological phenomenon and is difficult to observe 
empirically. This has not deterred political scientists from producing a substantial literature on 
the subject. Until recently, this literature consisted mostly of observational studies (Holbrook 
2011). Such designs suffer from well known limitations when it comes to establishing causal 
effects. This is particularly true of cross-sectional designs which are unable to establish the 
direction of causality between the attitude of interest and the explanatory variable. This problem 
can be somewhat alleviated using panel surveys (and to a lesser extent repeated surveys) which 
allow the researcher to narrow the cause of attitude change to events occurring between two 
attitude readings. However, even then the cause of the attitude change cannot be precisely 
identified. Dynamic real-world information environments are complex, and any given attitude is 
influenced by several factors at once. Moreover, attitude formation involves difficult-to-measure 
discrepancies such as framing effects. To fully address these problems, an experimental design is 
necessary. It allows the researcher to control the information environment, and manipulate only 




information constant, and manipulating only whether the target of that information is a party or 
an individual politician, and the target’s partisan affiliation vis-à-vis that of the respondent. 
 
Another significant advantage of the experimental method in relation to observational studies is 
that it allows us to overcome what is sometimes referred to as the fundamental problem of causal 
inference; “we cannot simultaneously observe a person or entity in its treated and untreated 
states” (Holland 1986). This is particularly precarious when the subjects are self-aware and non-
identical, such as in the present case. Whilst in the natural sciences it is often possible to expose 
the same entity (or at least functionally equivalent ones) to different treatments, human beings 
are stubbornly distinctive. Accordingly, distinguishing between effects particular to the 
phenomenon of interest and effects particular to the observed individuals is less than 
straightforward. Although within-subject designs allow us to observe the same individuals after 
exposure to different treatments, the possibility that effects of earlier treatments influence 
subsequent ones means that such observations cannot be treated as independent. This is 
particularly relevant to studies of clearly cumulative phenomena like attitude formation. The 
experimental method overcomes this problem through random administration of treatments. By 
ensuring that each subject has an equal chance to be in a particular treatment condition, 
individual differences in the sample is controlled for. In other words, when respondents are 
randomly assigned to treatment groups, these groups can be treated as identical (Druckman et al. 
2011).  
 
For the present purpose, the survey experiment is a particularly suitable implementation of the 
experimental method. A survey experiment is “a deliberate manipulation of the form or 
placement of items in a survey instrument, for purposes of inferring how public opinion works in 
the real world.” (Gaines et al. 2007: 3). Compared to laboratory experiments, survey experiments 
are both time and cost-effective to implement, and can be administered to a large number of 
subjects. More importantly, while laboratory experiments for practical purposes tend to rely on 
non-representative subject pools, the format of a survey experiment is easily administered using 
random sampling techniques that ensure a representative sample. To sum up ‒ random 




studies, and random sampling of subjects gives them an external validity edge over laboratory 
experiments. 
 
3.2.2 Priming and perceived entitativity 
Although it is a great advantage of the experimental method that it allows the researcher to 
manipulate the flow of information, there are also difficulties associated with this. In creating an 
artificial information environment, the experimenter runs the risk of unintentionally influencing 
participants through so-called “priming” effects. Of particular relevance here is the possibility 
that the presentation of information about an attitude object may influence its perceived 
entitativity.  
 
This conceptual issue is anticipated by the theory. An individual politician may uncontroversially 
be described as being and doing any number of things, but describing a party in the same terms 
gives the impression that it is a concrete and purposive entity when it might just as well be 
described in terms that emphasize its internal disunity. What is important is of course that 
information about the party in the experiment is presented as it would have been in a dynamic 
real-world setting. With this in mind, the experiment employs two different conceptualizations of 
political parties. The first is in line with the conceptualization of groups most frequently used in 
the entitativity literature, which views groups simply as collections of individuals. Accordingly, 
group traits and behaviors are presented as traits and behaviors belonging to different group 
members. Thus, Hamilton and Sherman (1996: 340) recommend the following design: 
 
The obvious strategy for this kind of work is quite simple. It involves presenting the 
identical information (e.g. a series of behavior descriptive sentences) to two groups of 
participants. One group is told that all of the information describes the same person; the 
other group is told that each information describes a different person but that all those 
persons are members of the same group.  A comparison of these two conditions then 
permits an analysis of the effects of the target of perception - individual or group - on the 





Forming an attitude towards a group is here understood as a process which involves attributing 
the individual traits and behaviors of group members to the group as a whole. Since the 
personalization literature emphasizes the collective/individual dichotomy, I make use of a similar 
approach here by estimating how attitudes towards a political party are affected by exposure to 
information about affiliated politicians. 
 
The second conceptualization describes parties as purposive agents capable of doing and being 
things in the direct sense employed in descriptions of individual persons. As an analytical claim 
this might be dubious, but that is less important than the fact that it reflects how parties are 
frequently described in everyday speech and in the media. If such descriptions prime individuals 
to perceive parties as highly entitative, and for the purpose of attitude formation treat them the 
same way they treat individuals, then that is of theoretical interest in its own right. If, on the 
other hand, there are differences between attitudes directed at parties and individual politicians 
even when parties are framed as highly entitative, it is clear that individuals process information 
about parties and politicians differently irrespective of how that information is presented. Since 
the flow of information about parties in real world contexts takes many forms, accounting for 
both conceptualizations of parties is necessary to ensure external validity. At the same time, it 
provides the opportunity to explore whether framing impacts on attitudes towards parties. If this 
is so, the patterns projected by the hypotheses are expected to be more pronounced when parties 
are described as collective entities than when they are described as purposive agents. That is, 
respondents in the collective party condition will be less receptive to new information than those 
assigned to the purposive party condition. 
 
3.2.3 The Norwegian Citizen Panel 
The experiment was conducted as part of the 18th wave of the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP). 
The NCP is a platform for internet-based surveys of public opinion on a range of social and 
political issues in Norway administered by the Digital Social Science Core Facility 
(DIGSSCORE) at the University of Bergen. The questionnaire was completed by a total of 1220 
respondents between June 2nd and 29th 2020. The invitation to take part in the survey was 
distributed via email. The participants were selected by random sampling of the Norwegian tax 




participation was that respondents had to be 18 or above, and be permanent residents of Norway. 
The NCP methodology report (Skjervheim et al. 2019) can be consulted for further information 
on sampling procedures and methodology.3 Due to time constraints, the data used in the analysis 
has not been through DIGSSCORE’s quality controls. 
 
3.2.4 Experimental design 
The experiment was designed to portray attitude formation during a political campaign. 
Respondents were asked to imagine an upcoming election in their municipality. They were 
exposed to two vignettes presented as summaries of local news coverage about a party or a 
politician, each of which were followed by an opinion reading in which the respondents 
indicated their overall impression of the target. The first vignette contained three snippets of 
information about the target, all of which were devised to produce an unambiguously positive 
impression. The second vignette contained unambiguously negative information meant to 
directly contradict aspects of the information contained in the initial vignette.  
 
The name of the party or party affiliation of the candidate was determined by the respondent’s 
own party identification. This was established in two pre-experiment questions in which 
respondents indicated which party they felt “closest to” and which party they felt “most distant 
from”. For each party and candidate condition, half the respondents were assigned the party they 
felt closest to, and the other half were assigned the party they felt most distant from.  
 
This simple design allows us to probe attitudinal responses to information about parties and 
candidates under different conditions of partisan alignment. One quarter of the respondents were 
assigned to the male candidate treatment, and another quarter to the female candidate treatment. 
In the vignettes, the candidate was described as a given party’s “top candidate”. The two 
conceptualizations of parties described above were treated as two separate treatments, and 
assigned one quarter of the respondents each. In the purposive party treatment, “the top 
candidate” was simply replaced with “the party”. In the collective party treatment, the 
information was presented as pertaining to a party’s “top three candidates”, and the three 
information snippets in the initial vignette were attributed to each of them separately. After 
 




reading these, the respondents were asked to indicate their impression of the party as a whole. 
The expectation-inconsistent behavior described in the second vignette was attributed to “one of 
the candidates,” and respondents were again asked to evaluate the party as a whole. The purpose 
was to estimate the extent to which respondents attribute information about a politician to the 
group as a whole. 
 
Table 3.1 displays the resulting division of treatment-groups. 
Table 3.1 - Treatment groups 
Politician Party 
Male Female Party (purposive) Top three candidates 
In-group Out-group In-group Out-group In-group Out-group In-group Out-group 
n = 163 n = 159 n = 149 n = 156 n = 152 n = 138 n = 148 n = 155 
n = 1220 
Table 1 
Several considerations went into the formulation of the vignettes. It was crucial that the 
information snippets were of a type that could reasonably be applied to both parties and 
individual candidates. Moreover, they had to be specific enough to ensure that respondents could 
form fairly informed impressions, and so that variations in evaluations were not too influenced 
by respondent-specific interpretations. Finally, the information had to be reasonably applicable 
to all the major political parties in Norway, meaning most substantive policy issues had to be 
avoided. A proposal to improve the municipalities roads and parks was deemed sufficiently 
bipartisan, and provides a set-up for the negative information presented subsequently. With this 
in mind. the initial part of the experiment was conducted with the following vignette (translated 
from Norwegian - see appendix for original):  
 
Imagine that there is an upcoming election in your municipality. During the campaign, 
the local newspaper writes the following about the [in or out-group party]’s [top 





● [He/She/The party/The first] has prepared a good plan to improve the 
municipality’s roads and parks. 
 
● [He/She/The Party/The second] demonstrates a sincere commitment to the 
inhabitants of the municipality. 
 
● [He/She/The Party/The third] is trusted by the voters, according to the 
newspaper’s polling. 
 
Based on the information above, what is your impression of the [candidate/party]? 
 
It was expected that out-group respondents, whose partisan predisposition was challenged by the 
positive information, would evaluate candidates more positively than the parties. In-group 
respondents, whose predispositions were confirmed by the positive information, were expected 
to have fairly similar evaluations of all the attitude objects, as the cognitive processes involved in 
coping with expectation-inconsistent information would not be engaged. 
 
The second vignette was designed to contradict the first one. After providing the first evaluation, 
the respondents were presented with the following vignette: 
 
The week before the election, the local newspaper prints a new piece about the 
[candidate/party/one of the candidates]. A leak of internal correspondence reveals that 
[he/she/the party/they4] do(es) not have plans to fulfill the promise of improving the 
municipality’s roads and parks. 
 
In light of this new information, what is your impression of the [candidate/party/party]? 
 
The breaking of an election promise was intended as a negative cue, compounded by the fact that 
plans were concealed from the public. Moreover, the information directly conflicts with the 
earlier descriptions of the attitude object as demonstrating a sincere commitment to the 
 




inhabitants of the municipality who, the respondents were told, have high trust towards it. In 
addition to being negative, this information was intended to shed new light on the information 
contained in the initial vignette. The degree of attitude change could then give an indication of 
how far the respondents integrate new information with prior beliefs. It was expected that in-
group respondents, now presented with negative information about a co-partisan object, would 
evaluate the candidate more negatively than the party. At the same time, out-group respondents 
would have their partisan predispositions confirmed, and downgrade all evaluations to a 
similarly low level. 
 
3.2.5 Variables 
The dependent variables are the evaluations of attitude objects recorded after exposure to the 
vignettes. These were measured on a continuous 11-point scale ranging from 0 (do not like at all) 
to 10 (like a great deal). General evaluative terms like these measured on a continuous scale have 
the advantage that they facilitate comparison of attitudes directed at different attitude objects. 
The party identity (PID) variable was based on two pre-survey questions. Respondents were 
asked the following questions: “Which party do you feel the closest to?” and “which party do 
you feel the most distant from?” Without relying on complex multi-item measures which in the 
present case would be impractical, closeness to party is an appropriate measure of party 
identification understood as group belonging rather than an evaluative attitude (Greene 2002: 
184). 
 




The data is analyzed in two steps. First, they are analyzed using a 4x2x2 design with two 
between subject factors (attitude object and partisan party identification) and one within subject 




between the attitude readings, I then analyze the change in evaluations as a 4x2 (attitude object 
and party identification). 
 
3.3.1 Results 
Table 2 reports the mean values of party and candidate evaluations recorded after respondents 
were exposed to each of the vignettes.  
 
Table 3.2 - Mean party and leader evaluations by treatment 
Mean evaluations after exposure 
to positive information 
In-group Out-group 
Female candidate 8.43 (148, 0.146) 5.59 (155, 0.203) 
Male candidate 8.13 (162, 0.155) 5.73 (159, 0.180) 
Party(collective) 8.29 (147, 0.144) 4.78 (154, 0.208) 
Party(purposive) 8.27 (154, 0.170) 4.90 (138, 0.211) 
   
Mean evaluations after exposure 
to negative information 
  
Female candidate 4.09 (148, 0.178) 2.26 (156, 0.123) 
Male candidate 4.02 (161, 0.159) 2.72 (159, 0.143) 
Party(collective) 5.12 (146, 0.198) 2.46 (155, 0.138) 
Party(purposive) 5.04 (152, 0.205) 2.52 (138, 0.140) 
 
Party and leader evaluations by partisan alignment. Cells show mean scores on a unipolar scale where 
respondents rate the likeability of the target, from 0 = ‘Not at all likeable’ to 10 ‘Very likeable’. Number of 
respondents and standard errors, respectively, are shown in the parentheses.  
Table 2 
 
The above panel displays evaluations recorded after exposure to the initial positive vignette. 
Consistent with expectations, respondents assigned to the in-group treatment made little 
distinction between the different attitude objects. Those assigned to the out-group treatment, 
however, evaluated the candidates considerably more positively than the parties. Accordingly, 
respondents were more responsive to information which challenges their partisan predispositions 





In group condition female candidates were evaluated moderately more positively than male 
candidates (an average of 0.30 points on the evaluation scale). In the outgroup condition this 
relation was reversed, and the difference more moderate. The two party treatments, however, 
were almost identical.  
 
The lower panel displays the mean values of evaluations recorded after exposure to the second, 
negative vignette. In line with the expectations, the effects are now reversed. Those assigned to 
the in-group treatment, now exposed to negative information about a co-partisan target, recorded 
considerably more negative attitudes towards the candidate than the party. Those assigned to the 
out-group condition, however, converged on similarly negative attitudes towards each attitude 
object. Accordingly, respondents were again more responsive to information which is 
incongruent with their partisan priors when evaluating candidates than parties. Once again, there 
were minimal differences within the party and candidate groups. In the ingroup condition, the 
female candidate was again evaluated more positively, but the gap between the male and female 
candidate was narrower. In the outgroup, the male candidate was as in the initial observation 
evaluated more positively then the female candidate, and the gap between them had widened 
considerably (0.32 points). Again there were minimal differences between the two party 
conditions.  These results are clearly visible in figure 3.1.  
 
The descriptive statistics appear to support hypotheses 1 and 2, but the gender effects are less 
clear. To examine whether the apparent differences are significant, I run a three-way mixed 









Table 3.3 - Three-way ANOVA 
Source  df F-value P 
Object  3 0.88 0.446 
PID  1 885.75 0.000 
Time  1 1443.51 0.000 
Object*PID  3 11.30 0.000 
Object*Time  3 9.96 0.000 
PID*Time  1 31.32 0.000 
Object*PID*Time  3 0.12 0.944 
Error  2414   
4x2x2 ANOVA with two between subject factors (attitude object and partisan affiliation) and one within 
subject factor (the first and second evaluation). 
Table 3 
All the effects apart from the three-way interaction are significant at a 0.05 significance level. 
The significance of the two-way interaction between party identification and attitude object 
confirms that respondents’ evaluations of the different attitude objects are significantly different 
within the in and out-groups. The analysis so far strongly suggests that this is due to differences 
in candidate and party evaluations among respondents who were exposed to information which 
challenged their partisan predispositions. A Tukey test (reported in appendix table 1) confirms 
this. Amongst the attitudes formed after exposure to the initial vignette, only the party and 
candidate treatments in the out-group condition are significantly different. Amongst attitudes 
formed after exposure to the second vignette, only differences between the party and candidate 










The non-significance of the three-way interaction is surprising and warrants further investigation. 
It suggests that the interaction between party identification and attitude object did not vary 
between the two evaluations recorded. A more straightforward way to approach the within-
subject effect is to examine how attitudes between the initial and the second evaluation. Table 
3.4 reports the mean change in evaluations between the two opinion readings. 
 
Table 3.4 - Mean change in party and leader evaluations by treatment 
Mean change in evaluations 
between opinion readings 
In-group Out-group 
Female candidate -4.34 (148, 0.228) -3.32 (155, 0.209) 
Male candidate -4.14 (160, 0.210) -3.01 (159, 0.225) 
Party(collective) -3.16 (146, 0.204) -2.31 (146, 0.218) 
Party(purposive) -3.23 (152, 0.221) -2.38 (138, 0.224) 
   
Change in party and leader evaluations by partisan alignment. Cells show the difference between the mean 
evaluations recorded after exposure to the positive vignette, and the mean evaluations recorded after exposure to 
the negative vignette. The evaluations were recorded on a unipolar scale where respondents rate the likeability of 
the target, from 0 = ‘Not at all likeable’ to 10 ‘Very likeable’. Number of respondents and standard errors, 
respectively, are shown in the parentheses.  
Table 4 
To begin with, it should be noted that the greater evaluative change recorded amongst in-group 
respondents is likely due to their more positive initial evaluations, meaning they had further to 
fall when exposed to the negative information. More interesting than the magnitude of the fall is 
the fact that the difference between change in party and candidate evaluation was approximately 
the same in the in and out-groups conditions. That is, both groups punished the candidate more 













The diagram clearly shows that parties and candidates were evaluated differently, and that the 
difference is almost perfectly parallel for the in and out-group conditions. This is reflected in the 
non-significant interaction between party identity and attitude objects reported in table 4.4 (two-
way ANOVA of change in evaluation). However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the 
processes that distinguish party and candidate evaluations are not moderated by partisan 
motivated reasoning. This is because the initial evaluation from which the evaluative change was 





calculated already contained bias. It appears that this was almost perfectly offset by the bias of 
the second evaluation.  
Table 3.5 – Two-way ANOVA: change in evaluation 
Source 
 
df F-value P 
Object 
 
3 12.46 0.00 
PID 
 
1 39.56 0.00 
Object*PID 
 





Two-way ANOVA  
Table 5 
In the initial evaluation, respondents in the in-group condition whose partisan predispositions 
were confirmed by the positive vignette evaluated all attitude objects at the same, positive level, 
while the out-group respondents evaluated the candidate more positively than the party. In the 
second evaluation, this dynamic was reversed, and almost perfectly so. Out-group respondents 
whose partisan predispositions were affirmed evaluated all attitude objects at the same, negative 
level. In-group respondents, meanwhile, punished the candidate more than the party, at a 
magnitude almost identical to out-group respondents' initial favoring of candidates over parties. 
Interestingly, the effect of in and out-group bias appears to have reverse-identical effects on 
party and candidate evaluations. 
Another noteworthy observation is that both in and out-group partisans appear to have punished 
female candidates more than male candidates for the transgression described in the second 
vignette. This provides partial support of the backlash effect without moderation effect. 
However, a Tukey test (reported in Appendix table 2) shows that the difference is not statistically 






The experiment explored whether party and candidate evaluations respond differently to 
information effects, and whether this dynamic is mediated by partisan motivated reasoning. In so 
doing, I have empirically tested a claim often made in the personalization literature; that 
candidates have an advantage over collective entities like parties in reaching across partisan 
divides and appealing to new voters. The theory suggested that the abstract and collective nature 
of parties facilitates a biased (dis)confirmation of information which conflicts with partisan 
predispositions. In contrast, the expectation of internal unity of individual persons facilitates an 
integrative style of information processing. This was the basis of hypothesis of 1 and 2, both of 
which were strongly supported by the results. 
Respondents evaluating candidates displayed lower bias when confronted with information 
which challenges partisan predispositions. The same type of information produces systematically 
different attitudinal responses depending on whether the attitude object was a party or an 
individual candidate. This is in accordance with the personalization literature, which suggests 
that person-centered politics is a viable means to reach across partisan divides. However, there is 
a risk involved; just as out-group partisans reward individual candidates more than parties, in-
group partisans also punish them more for transgressions. 
Surprisingly, the respondents assigned to the purposive and collective party conditions recorded 
almost identical evaluations of the target. In the collective condition, the information contained 
in the initial positive vignette was presented as describing three different candidates belonging to 
the party. The transgression described in the second vignette, was committed by only one of 
them, meaning responses involved generalizing the behavior of one group member to the group 
as a whole. 
The analysis revealed no significant backlash effect in the evaluations of female candidates. This 




Moreover it should be noted that does not rule out forms of discriminations not captured simply 
like/dislike attitudes measured in this experiment.    
 
3.3.3 Limitations 
The analysis gives cause for optimism about the theory. However, certain limitations of the 
research design should be addressed in future studies. First, it is possible that the anonymity of 
the candidates described in the experiment facilitated more extreme responses to the treatment 
material. Since the candidates were anonymous, the respondents had no prior knowledge about 
them apart from what was derived from their party affiliation. The information contained in the 
vignettes was therefore all they knew about the candidates, and this might have elicited 
particularly extreme evaluations. In contrast, respondents evaluating parties may have had the 
local chapter of their own in or out-group party in mind as they completed the survey. In that 
case, prior knowledge may have moderated the effect of new information. This should be 
addressed in future research by embedding the experiment more fully in a realistic context, using 
real candidates.  
 
While the extremity or moderation of evaluative responses to new information is indicative of 
the information processing strategy used, the experiment could have benefited from the inclusion 
of post-treatment questions to further narrow down the cognitive processes used by the 
respondents. Future research should include variables commonly used to distinguish between 
online and memory-based information processing such as response latencies, measures of recall, 

















Party and leader evaluations during the 2017 
German federal election: Information effects 





The previous chapter used a survey experiment to explore whether citizens evaluate parties and 
candidates differently. By keeping the flow of information constant, and manipulating the target 
of that information, it was established that citizens respond differently to the same kind of stimuli 
when evaluating parties and candidates. However, politics is not conducted in a laboratory 
setting. This chapter explores party and candidate evaluations in a dynamic information 
environment. Rather than exploring the effects of specific pieces of information, which now is 
unknown, it examines the overall effects of information on party and leader evaluations. I make 
use of survey panel data from the campaign leading up to the 2017 German federal election to 
explore how voters updated their attitudes towards parties and leaders in response to new 
information. Using a Bayesian learning model, I estimate and compare the relative effects of 
prior beliefs and new information on party and leader evaluations, and the effect of partisan bias 
on information processing. 
 
First, I present the hypotheses and case selection. I then explain the rationale of the Bayesian 
learning model, and its relevance for this study. The data, variables and statistical model are then 
presented, and the analysis conducted. Contrary to expectations, respondents surveyed in the 
time leading up to the 2017 German federal election displayed remarkably similar updating 
behavior across the two types of attitude objects. However, in accordance with the theory, 






4.1 Hypotheses and case selection 
This chapter shifts focus from direct to overall information effects. That is, it examines the use of 
information in party and leader evaluations, whilst remaining agnostic about the quality and 
quantity of that information. The purpose is to explore whether patterns consistent with the 
theoretical framework presented in chapter two are observable in the overall effects of 




Accounting for the effect of information processing on political attitudes poses a significant 
challenge. It involves looking beyond the direct effects of political phenomena, to estimate how 
individuals respond to the flow of information about them. For this reason, most studies on the 
topic use experimental designs which give the researcher full control of the flow of information. 
The benefits of the experimental method were exploited in the previous chapter. Here, I address 
the well known concern that direct observation of micro-processes in laboratory settings cannot 
be assumed to provide valid estimates of how the same processes play out in a dynamic real 
world setting. In politics, how citizens respond to individual pieces of information is typically 
less consequential than the overall effect of the near unlimited quantities of information that they 
are exposed to on a day to day basis. Accordingly, this chapter shifts focus from specific to 
overall information effects. That is to say, it examines the use of information in party and leader 
evaluations, whilst remaining agnostic about the quality and quantity of that information. The 
broad aim of this chapter is to explore whether patterns consistent with the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter two are observable in the overall effects of information on party and leader 
evaluations. 
Chapter two argued that citizens are flexible information processors who employ different 
strategies depending on the task at hand. These are usually thought of as falling along a 
continuum from online to memory-based information processing. In the former case, 
“evaluations are formed online, with continuous updating of the summary evaluation as new 




time an opinion is expressed by retrieving specific pieces of information from long-term memory 
and integrating that information to create a summary judgment” (McGraw 2011: 243). Despite 
widespread acceptance of this model, political scientists rarely examine which structural 
conditions determine the information processing strategy used (McGraw 2011). The central 
proposition of this thesis is that different information processing strategies are used in party and 
candidate evaluations. 
As shown in chapter two, research clearly indicates that candidate evaluations are largely formed 
online, meaning they are relatively responsive to new information. The role of information 
processing in party evaluations is less clear, but citizens appear to have fairly stable relationships 
with parties, relying to a greater extent on beliefs stored in long term memory. Accordingly it is 
expected that party evaluations are more reliant on prior beliefs and leader evaluations are more 
responsive to new information. This forms the first hypothesis: 
H1: Party evaluations are more reliant on prior beliefs and leader evaluations are more 
responsive to new information.  
It was further proposed that the dynamic which differentiates party and leader evaluations 
interacts with partisan motivated reasoning. The retrospective mode of attitude formation 
associated with party evaluations is amplified by the effect of partisan predispositions. In effect, 
the abstract nature of the party facilitates a dissociation of unexpected information, as well as a 
partisan interpretation of new information. This forms the basis of the second hypothesis: 
H2: Party evaluations are more susceptible to a biased interpretation of new information.  
 
4.1.2 The case of Germany 
The unique characteristics of the German electoral system are the results of a concerted effort by 
the founders to curtail the instability of pure proportional systems, which they had experienced 
during the Weimar republic. The mixed-member proportional system was devised as a 
compromise between CDU/CSU, who favored a plurality system, and the parliamentary majority 
which did not (Klingemann & Wessels 2003: 280). It can be thought of as “a ‘middle way’ 
between pure proportional and majoritarian or plurality electoral systems” (Wagner & Weßels 




5% threshold win seats proportional to their share of votes on what is known as the second 
ballot. However, voters may also cast an additional vote in single-seat districts which account for 
half the parliamentary seats. This so-called first vote is cast for a named candidate, who is elected 
by nominal plurality. This plurality element was expressly introduced by the founders with the 
express aim to incentivize personalized politics at the grassroots (Klingemann & Wesselss 2003). 
Although the first vote does not alter the power-share in the Bundestag (each direct mandate won 
via the first vote replaces one won via the second vote), it may influence voters’ disposition 
towards parties and candidates. As Wagner and Weßels (2012: 74) note, “voters in Germany may 
be more used to care about candidates than voters in pure list systems because of the existence of 
a personal vote”.  
Another characteristic of the German political system which is often said to facilitate 
personalization is the broad power of the chancellery (Wagner and Weßels 2012: 3; Garzia 2011: 
12). This is in line with McAllister’s (2007) claim that greater executive authority manifested in 
an ability to shape policy is a sign of institutional personalization, and one of the causes of 
personalized voting behavior. As the only cabinet member elected by the Bundestag, the 
chancellor has the sole power to select and dismiss Federal ministers. Moreover, the chancellor 
formulates government policy, and has the power to establish, change and terminate federal 
ministries. Taken together, these two characteristics incentivize voters to familiarize themselves 
with, and take seriously, the individual politicians at the center of German politics. The term 
kanzlerdemokratie highlights the central position of the chancellor in German politics 
(Mommsen 2007). 
Just as frequently, however, Germany is referred to as a parteienstaat, characterized by a stable 
party system. Stability has indeed been a central feature of the German political system which 
since its conception has been dominated by the two volksparteien, CDU/CSU and SPD. Until the 
Greens straddled the 5% threshold in 1983, the German party system could be characterized as a 
“two-and-a-half party system of a bipolar structure with the Free Democrats (Liberals) being the 
key actor to make or break governments” (Klingemann & Wesselss 1999: 7). With the Greens, it 
was instead a “two-and-two-halves” system. Throughout this period (1961-1994), the average 
change in votes from one election to another was just 2.6% and 2.5% for CDU/CSU and SPD 




However, in Germany as elsewhere, a steady weakening of traditional social ties since the 70s is 
eroding the partisan identities underlying this stability. This is evident in the steady rise in the 
number of parliamentary parties and increased voter volatility (Arzheimer 2006). This seemingly 
came to a head in the 2017 federal election, where CDU/CSU and SPD jointly received just 53 
per cent of the votes, their worst results to date. At the same time, the entrance of AFD and re-
entrance of FDP to parliament marks the highest number of parliamentary parties yet.  
 
4.2 Bayesian learning 
The hypotheses are tested using a Bayesian learning model. Such models are often critiqued for 
taking an overly optimistic view of voter rationality. However, the usefulness of the Bayesian 
learning model is not restricted to its accuracy as a model of voter psychology. It may also be 
used as an “accounting device” to assess the relative impacts of prior beliefs and new 
information (Bartels 1993: 268). In this section, I explain the rationale of the Bayesian learning 
model and its relevance for this study. 
 
4.2.1 Bayesian learning models 
Bayesian learning models derive from the Bayesian approach to statistical inference. Contrary to 
the frequentist tradition, which takes parameters to be fixed estimates of some underlying 
frequency, Bayesian statistics assumes that empirical phenomena are observed through uncertain 
parameters, represented as probability distributions. Bayesian inference is therefore a matter of 
weighing uncertain pieces of evidence against each other. Specifically, when faced with new 
information about some phenomenon, the Bayesian weighs the certainty of his prior beliefs (the 
weighted average of previously encountered information) against the certainty of the new 
evidence. Amongst its key characteristics, therefore, Bayesian inference is subjective – the 
impact of new information is conditional on the prior beliefs of the perceiver.  
Bayesian learning models are based on the idea that in addition to being a useful mode of 
statistical inference, Bayesian inference approximates the real process whereby individuals 
update their beliefs in response to new information. As a model of political attitude formation, it 
has several compelling properties. In particular, it captures the uncertainty involved in navigating 
the political information environment. Political attitudes, and the precision of the evidence that 




as fixed estimates (Bullock 2009: 1110). Moreover, Bayes’ theorem offers a parsimonious 
formalization of the intuitive notion that learning is a function of past experiences. Put simply, 
people “weigh new information through the lens of prior beliefs” (McAvoy 2015: 71).  
In the political science literature, Bayesian learning models have been used to formalize the role 
of prior beliefs within a rational choice framework. In the 1970s, “revisionists” proposed 
Bayesian priors as an explanation of the relative stability of partisan attitudes not grounded in 
social identity theory (Fiorina 1981). Crucially, Bayesian learning demonstrated how attitudes 
could be affected by one’s experience of political events, whilst at the same time influencing 
how such experiences impact on attitude formation. Contrary to the Michigan models’ 
conceptualization of party identification as largely unresponsive to political events, Bayesian 
learning suggests that attitude stability is a result of political experience.  The paradigmatic 
example of this line of thought holds that political attitudes are based on a “running tally of 
retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance” (Fiorina 1981: 84). This 
retrospective model of attitude formation was formalized in the Bayesian framework by Achen 
(1992), and further elaborated by Gerber and Green (1998), who found that consistent with 
Bayesian learning, voters tend to stabilize their beliefs as they age and acquire political 
experience. 
 
As explained in chapter two, the political attitude literature is framed by the debate between 
social identity and rational choice perspectives. In this context, the proposition that voters are 
unbiased information processors has been a particularly controversial premise of the Bayesian 
learning model. As greater attention has been devoted to the role of cognitive heuristics, 
moreover, Bayesian learning seems an increasingly unrealistic model of voters’ psychology. 
While it can account for the relative effects of prior beliefs and new evidence, it cannot account 
for biases in the cognitive processes involved in the interpretation of that evidence (Bartels, 
2002: Lodge & Taber: 2006). That is, it cannot account for motivated reasoning. 
 
However, the utility of the Bayesian learning models is not limited to their ability to explain the 





Bayesian models of public opinion can be heuristically useful even if we wrongly assume 
that people are Bayesians, because they offer a systematic way to account for the relative 
influences of old beliefs and new information.  
 
The basic idea is that an assumption of Bayesian rationality allows us to represent attitudes and 
attitude change in terms of information effects. If we assume that attitude change is due to new 
information, examining the components of that change gives an insight into the use of new 
information. As Bartels (1993: 268) explains:  
 
Bayes’ rule may or may not be a realistic behavioral model; but it is certainly a useful 
accounting device—in particular because it provides a systematic way to characterize 
both the relative weight of old and new information in people’s current opinions and the 
nature and sources of the new information they have absorbed between any two opinion 
readings.  
 
Following Bartels, this chapter employs a Bayesian learning model to account for the relative 
effects of prior beliefs and new information in party and leader evaluations. This will allow us to 
test the hypotheses presented above. A closer review of the formal model will make this clear. 
 
4.2.2 The formal model 
Borrowing Bartels’ (2002: 121) notation, the process whereby individuals update their beliefs in 
response to new information can be expressed formally through Bayes’ theorem. In the present 
case, this means thinking about the practice of evaluating a party or a leader as an attempt to 
work out one’s true attitude towards the target ‒ that is, one’s feelings towards the party or leader 
in the ideal situation that all relevant information about them is known. Let 𝜇 represent this true 
attitude. 𝜇𝑖𝑡−1 is the mean of a normal distribution with variance  1/𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 representing individual 
𝑖’s  estimation of 𝜇  at time 𝑡 − 1. The variance designates certainty of individual 𝑖′𝑠 prior 
belief. 𝜇𝑖𝑡, the posterior belief, is the updated evaluation provided after having been exposed to 
evidence 𝑥𝑖𝑡, represented as the mean of a normal distribution with variance 𝜔𝑖𝑡. Given this, the 





𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡−1 𝜋𝑖𝑡−1/(𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡) + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜔𝑖𝑡 /(𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡)                                  (1)                                  
 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜔𝑖𝑡                                                                                               (2) 
 
where the posterior belief is a weighted average of the prior belief 𝜇𝑖𝑡−1and evidence𝑥𝑖𝑡, each 
weighted by their variance. The explanation is intuitive. The more precise the prior attitude (the 
closer 1/𝜋𝑖𝑡−1is to 1), the higher its effect on posterior attitudes. Similarly, 𝜔𝑖𝑡close to 1 signifies 
that the evidence is precise, and will have considerable effect on the posterior attitude. The 
precision of the posterior attitude 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is given by equation (2), and is the sum of the prior 
precision 𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 and the precision of the evidence  𝜔𝑖𝑡. 
 
In the framework of the Bayesian learning model, two different scenarios can account for the 
effect of prior beliefs and new information during attitude formation. The first is the strength of 
the prior attitude, represented in the model as its variance  1/𝜋𝑖𝑡−1. The second is the strength of 
the new evidence, again represented in the model as its variance 𝜔𝑖𝑡. The patterns projected by 
hypothesis 1 (that party evaluations are more reliant on prior beliefs than leader evaluations) can 
therefore be explained by two different dynamics.  
 
The first is the attitude strength perspectives presented in chapter two which holds that attitudes 
towards parties are stronger than attitudes towards candidates. The other possibility, that 
information about parties is less certain than information about candidates is consistent with the 
theory of entitativity. In short, integrating new information into a summary judgement is more 
difficult when the target is perceived as having low entitativity; when the perceived entitativity 
of an object is low, it is less clear how the new information fits in with existing attitudes. 
Accordingly, new information is perceived as less certain. Although this distinction is of 
theoretical significance, it will not be accounted for in the analysis, which focuses on the relative 
impacts of prior beliefs and new information. Still, it should be emphasized that these two 





As alluded to above, a third dynamic not accounted for by the rationale of Bayesian learning may 
influence the relative effects of prior beliefs and new information during attitude formation. 
Motivated reasoning refers to cases in which prior beliefs not only determine the impact of new 
information, but influence how that information is interpreted. That is, when “individuals are 
more willing to accept and evaluate positively information which is congruent with already 
existing priors” (Bargsted 2011: 9). Exactly what this violation of Bayesian learning looks like in 
empirical terms is a matter of debate. It is often claimed that unbiased bayesians should tend 
towards attitude convergence if given enough time and information (Bartels 2002). Against this, 
Gerber and Green argue that attitude divergence may persist without offending against Bayes’ 
rule when ideologically opposed individuals use different evaluative criteria (Gerber & Green, 
1998). As Gerber and colleagues put it: “If, in a college dormitory, half the students like 
Mexican cuisine and the other half do not, we would not cite mixed reviews of the lunch menu 
when tacos are served as evidence of perceptual bias” (Gerber & Green 1999: 206). Since this 
chapter merely uses the Bayesian learning model as an “accounting device”, and does not aim to 
assess whether voters behave as good Bayesians, it will remain agnostic on the conceptual 
question about what constitutes a violation of Bayesian inference. The role of partisan 
information processing is implemented by estimating how much of the effect of new information 
is accounted for by party identification. 
 
4.3 Variables and Measurement 
The hypotheses are tested using data collected in the run-up to the 2017 German federal election. 
The availability of short-term campaign panel data is crucial for the analysis because it allows us 
to estimate the effect of prior evaluations. The Bayesian learning model is approximated using an 
autoregressive model, with the autoregressive parameter estimated as a random coefficient. In 
this section, I present the data, variables and statistical model. 
 
4.3.1 Data 
To test the hypotheses, I use data from the Short-Term Campaign Panel data set collected by 
GESIS - The Leibniz Social Science (Roßteutscher et al. 2019). The panel followed 6778 
respondents (the survivors from wave 1) for a period of little more than a year, culminating 




exploring the effects of prior beliefs and new information. Elections act as “collective learning 
experiences” in which voters’ attention is uncharacteristically attuned to political events, and 
they are more likely to be exposed to new information (Gelman & King, 1993; Lodge et al., 
1995).  
 
Although the panel is made up of 10 waves, I use only waves 2 to 8. The first wave is excluded 
since the model relies on previous waves for information on prior evaluations. The final two 
post-election waves are excluded to improve cross-wave comparability since the election results 
are likely to have strong effects on attitudes towards the leaders and parties. The analysis is 
therefore limited to 7 waves collected at regular intervals between February 16th and September 
23rd, with the final wave collected immediately before the election on the September 24th. The 
relatively short intervals between each wave is a considerable benefit to the research design. We 
may assume that changes in party and leader evaluations are due to the stream of political 
information and not to changes in their underlying dispositions and ideological outlooks.  
 
4.3.2 Variables 
The dependent variables are based on evaluations of all five parties that had seats in the 
Bundestag prior to the election and their leaders, with the addition to the Alternative for 
Germany (AFD). The survey used similar wording and identical scales in the party and leader 
evaluation items. Respondents were asked “what do you think of the different parties in 
general?” and “please state what you think of some leading politicians”.  The response was 
indicated on an 11-point scale ranging from -5 (I do not think much of the party/politician at all) 
to 5 (I think a great deal of the party/politician). The responses were coded on a scale from 1 
(dislike) to 11 (like). The similarity of the language and scale used for the party and leader items 
bodes well for the comparability of the results. As noted in the previous chapter, the like/dislike 
scale is an appropriate variable for measuring dispositional attitudes across different attitude 
objects. 
 
The main independent variable is party identification (PID). As in the previous chapter, this 
variable is measured as closeness to a political party. Respondents were asked to indicate which 




attachments to several parties at once, secondary party identification is also included using the 
same type of measurements (Mayer 2013). Respondents were also asked to indicate the strength 
of identification on a 5-point Likert scale, but this item was excluded from the analysis since 
measurements of attitude strength confounds party identity understood as in/out group 
membership with partisanship as an evaluative attitude (Greene 2002). Although the party 
identification items were included in each wave, I use only responses from the first wave 
included in the analysis in order to avoid the risk of simultaneous causation. Unfortunately, the 
survey did not include appropriate measures of negative (out-group) partisanship (Medeiros & 
Noel 2013). Consequently, the model will only estimate the effect of in-group attitudes. 
 
I include a political knowledge index to control for the possibility that “more knowledgeable 
people tend to have more stable opinions that resist media influence.” (McGraw & Ling 2003: 
25). This variable is based on a 16-question quiz about German politics. In addition to this, I 
include standard demographic control variables (gender, education and age).  
 
4.3.3 Statistical model 
Following Bartels (1993; 2002), the rationale of the Bayesian learning model is approximated by 
regressing party and leader evaluations on evaluations given in the previous wave. This yields a 
simple autoregressive model: 
 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡                                        (3) 
 
Where 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 and the lagged term 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 represents like/dislike evaluations of 
a particular party or party leader. In line with the Bayesian learning model presented in equation 
1, these evaluations are assumed to be the respondents’ estimate of the mean value of the true 
evaluation 𝜇 at time 𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡−1respectively. Accordingly, 𝛽0is an approximate measure of the 
precision 1/𝜋𝑖𝑡−1associated with the prior belief. It should have a value between 0 and 1, with 
higher values indicating strong priors. In line with the assumption that attitude change is the 
result of new information, the entirety of the effect not accounted for by the lagged dependent 
variable is the effect of new information. This is represented in the model by 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡, 





In the present case, we are interested in the effects of two variables. The first is the direct effect 
of prior beliefs on new information, represented by the lagged dependent variable. Second is the 
effect of party identification on information processing, understood as the effect of party 
identification on the interpretation of new information. Having controlled for the effect of the 
prior evaluation, any effect of party identification on attitude change is interpreted as partisan 
information processing. As Bartels (2002: 124) explains: “[i]f political learning is based on 
shared assessments of common political experience, there is no reason to expect the new 
information […] to vary with respondents’ prior partisan loyalties.”  
To approximate the formal model as closely as possible, the autoregressive parameter is 
estimated as a random coefficient. This allows for individual-level heterogeneity in the effect of 
prior attitudes, meaning heterogenous prior influence is accounted for in the estimation of the 
other variables (Bargsted 2011: 15). The model assumes that the association between the lagged 
and posterior evaluation depends on the strength of the prior. Accordingly, it is crucial to ensure 
that the effects of partisanship accounts for variations in the effect of prior evaluations.  
Put together, these considerations yield the following model: 
 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐼𝐷 + 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2−4𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡              
(3)                                                                            
 
4.4 Analysis 
The model is first run separately on each party and leader to get an overview of how the 
coefficients behave in each case. Each party and leader pair is then included in the same model 
for systematic comparison of the observed effects. This is achieved by interacting the variables 
of interest with a dummy variable indicating whether the evaluation is targeted at a party or a 
leader. The analysis does not support hypothesis one, but finds strong support for hypothesis 2.  
 
4.4.1 Results 
In the first instance, the model is estimated separately for each party and leader. Because each 




strategies, it makes sense to approach the analysis through pairwise comparisons. The results are 
reported in table 4.1a and b.  
Looking first at the effect of the lagged dependent variable (Yit-1), we see that there appears to 
be little difference in the relative roles of prior evaluations and new information in party and 
leader evaluations. Surprisingly, leader evaluations were slightly more affected by the lagged 
dependent variable than party evaluations in the cases of CDU/Merkel, SPD/Schulz and Die 
Linke/Wagenknecht. In an immediate blow to hypothesis 1, the most stable evaluations were 
directed at a leader, Merkel, for whom an average of 79% of posterior evaluations were  
accounted for by the prior. This may in part be a result of her campaign strategy, which focused 
on stability and continuity. More importantly, she had by then been chancellor for three terms, 
and as familiar to German voters as can be, most of whom had probably made their minds up 
about her in advance. A similar point may be made in regards to Schulz, who entered the 
campaign with a strong personal image. When he took over as SPD leader early on in the survey 
period, his popularity benefited SPD’s image, which quickly rose in the polls. This may explain 
the apparent volatility of SPD-evaluations, which were the least reliant on prior beliefs. 
At any rate, the relative use of prior beliefs and new information in party and leader evaluations 
appears to be influenced by factors that are idiosyncratic to the campaign and the particular 
parties and leaders. That is, they are not subject to systematic differences between the party and 
leader categories. Amongst the party/leader pairs that fit with the expectation, party evaluations 
are only slightly more reliant on prior attitudes than leader evaluations. There are no indications 
of a systematic difference in party and leader evaluations, and so there appears to be no support 




Table 4.1a – Regression results for each party and candidate 




















































































































Results of autoregressive model with random coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Note: * = significant at 5% ** significant 



















































































































Results of autoregressive model with random coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Note: * = significant at 5% **  








Moving on to the effect of party identification, things look more promising. Recall that this 
coefficient indicates the effect of party identification on the interpretation of new information. 
Having controlled for the effect of prior evaluations, any effects associated with party 
identification are those that bring about attitude change. In line with the assumption of Bayesian 
updating, we think of these as information effects. Even with the prior evaluation accounted for, 
there are significant and considerable effects of party identification across the board. This 
estimate, representing partisan bias, range from 1.85 for evaluations of FDP to 0.45 for Merkel.   
 
Moreover, there appears to be a marked difference between party and leader evaluations, with 
the former category being considerably more influenced by partisan bias than the latter. Indeed, 
the effect of party identification is higher in party than leader evaluations across the board, and 
considerably so. It is particularly striking that this is the case even when the overall effect of new 
information is lower in party than leader evaluations.5 That is to say, even when affected less by 
new information overall, party evaluations are affected more by partisan information processing 
than leader evaluations. In support of hypothesis 2, the effect of party identification on party 
evaluations appears to be considerably and systematically higher than its effect on leader 
evaluations. 
 
4.4.2 Testing for significance 
To explore whether the apparent differences in party and leader evaluations are statistically 
significant, a second set of models are estimated. These are broadly the same as above, but now 
each party and leader pair is included in the same model. Accordingly, the evaluation recorded 
on the dependent variable is directed at either a party or a party leader. A dummy variable is 
included to account for this. It is coded 1 if the evaluation is directed at a leader, and 0 if it is 
directed at a party. By interacting this variable with the lagged dependent variable and party 
identification, we can estimate whether the effects of these variables are significantly stronger in 
party or leader evaluations. Since the dummy variable is coded 1 for leader evaluations, a 
 
5 That is, when the effect of the lagged dependent variable is higher in the party than the leader evaluation. This is 





positive coefficient on the interaction effect suggests that the variable under consideration has a 
stronger effect in leader than party evaluations. Conversely, a negative coefficient suggests that 
the effect on leader evaluations is weaker than the effect on party evaluations. 
 
The results are displayed in table 4.2. Looking first at the interaction between the leader dummy 
and the lagged dependent variable, the initial observations are confirmed. There are significant 
differences in the use of prior beliefs in party and leader evaluations, but these are moderate, and 
idiosyncratic to the particular party and leader under evaluation. In accordance with the initial 
observations, the effect of the lagged dependent variable is greater in leader evaluations than 
party evaluations for CDU/Merkel, SPD/Schulz and Die Linke/Wagenknecht, but only 
moderately so. Accordingly, there are no systematic differences between the party and candidate 
categories. Accordingly, hypothesis one is rejected. 
 
The interaction between party identification and the leader dummy also fits with the initial 
observations. They show that the leader dummy is negatively correlated with the effect of party 
identification on the dependent variable for all party and leader pairs.  Accordingly, leader 
evaluations were significantly less affected by partisan information processing than party 
evaluations. The effect varies considerably between the party/leader pairs, but is considerable 
across the board. This provides strong support for hypothesis 2.  
 
4.4.3 Discussion 
This chapter has explored and compared party and leader evaluations in a dynamic information 
environment. Rather than estimating the direct effects of measured information exposure, it 
examined how information was used overall in party and leader evaluations.  
 
The analysis found no systematic difference between the two categories when it comes to the 




Table 4.2 – Regression results for each party and leader pair with leader dummy 




















































































































































Results of autoregressive model with random coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Note: * = significant at 5% **  





rely more heavily on prior beliefs in their evaluations of parties than candidates. However, it 
should be noted that this does not mean that party and leader evaluations are not subject to 
different information processing strategies. To establish this, we would have to account for the 
flow of information, which was not possible in the present case. Still, an analysis of overall 
information effects is consequential even if it does not allow us to directly test the causal 
mechanisms proposed by the theory. This study has shown that even if party and leader 
evaluations involve different information processing strategies at the micro-level, these are not 
apparent in overall information effects. This may be due to the particulars of the information 
environment rather than cognitive processes. 
 
Even if party evaluations on the whole are as stable as candidate evaluations, they are clearly 
more susceptible to biased information processing. This is a striking result. It suggests that 
variations in party evaluations, although as considerable as variations in leader evaluations, are 
more beholden to party identifications. That is, attitude change occurs, but is more biased. 
Further investigation is necessary to get a better handle on the nature of these biased attitude 
changes. It is for example possible that party evaluations, being subject to partisan information 
processing, over time are more likely than leader evaluations to revert back to a mean value over 
time. At any rate, the results give cause for optimism about hypothesis two. Leader evaluations 
were less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations. 
 
4.4.4 Limitations 
The analysis provides strong support for hypothesis two, but does not support hypothesis one. 
This may be due to limitations in the lagged dependent variable as a measurement of attitude 
stability. Accordingly, future research should examine the stability of party and candidate 
evaluations over time, accounting for the possibility that unstable evaluations may fluctuate 
around a mean value. This is an important dimension of attitude stability. 
 
Another significant limitation in the study was that it did not include a measure of negative party 
identification. Accounting for the effect of negative party identification on information 




showed that the different degrees of partisan bias in party and leader evaluations was near 







As candidates displace parties in the “structure of electoral attitudes”, considerable attention has 
been devoted to the question of what differentiates attitudes directed at parties from attitudes 
directed at candidates. To this end, the literature has focused on a particular component of 
attitudes known as impressions. This thesis has expanded this field of inquiry to the related but 
analytically distinct concept of evaluations. In so doing, it has sought to answer the following 
research question: 
 
Are candidate evaluations less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations? 
 
The claim that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations is 
often made in the personalization literature. However, it mainly comes up as an explanation of 
personalized patterns of voting behavior and campaign strategies, and not as a phenomenon to be 
explained and tested in its own right. In examining the research question, this thesis developed a 
theoretical framework and conducted two empirical studies. In so doing, it made several 
contributions to the literature. 
 
5.1 Theoretical contribution 
Chapter two made a theoretical contribution. It identified limitations in the classical theories of 
political attitudes, which tend to view attitudes as direct responses to socio-political phenomena. 
Because they do not take seriously the role of cognitive heuristics in information processing, 
they overlook important mechanisms which influence how information is processed during 
attitude formation. Hamilton and Sherman’s use of the concept of entitativity to explain 
differences in evaluations of individuals and groups was adapted to the case of candidates and 




psychology” (Leeper & Slothuus 2014: 130), this meant combining their theoretical framework 
with the theory of motivated reasoning. On this basis, I made argued that the abstract nature of 
parties facilitates a biased (dis)confirmation of information which challenges partisan 
predispositions. Candidate evaluations, on the other hand, facilitate an integrative style of 
information processing which is less easily captured by partisan bias. 
 
5.2 Empirical contributions 
Chapter three and four made empirical contributions to the literature. Chapter three explored the 
research question through a survey experiment conducted on a representative sample of 
Norwegian citizens. The experiment was designed to portray attitude formation during a political 
campaign leading up to a municipal election in Norway. By exposing respondents to the same 
information, and manipulating the target of that information, it was shown that candidate 
evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations. Respondents were 
considerably more responsive to information which challenged their partisan predispositions 
when evaluating candidates than parties. 
The purpose of chapter four was to explore party and candidate evaluations in a dynamic 
information environment. To do so, it examined party and candidate evaluations in the run-up to 
the 2017 German federal election. A Bayesian learning model was implemented on panel data to 
estimate the use of old and new information in party and candidate evaluations, and the extent to 
which new information is subject to partisan bias. Contrary to the anticipations of the theoretical 
framework developed in chapter two, respondents surveyed in the time leading up to the 2017 
German federal election displayed remarkably similar updating behavior across the two types of 
attitude objects. However, the results corroborated the main finding from chapter 3, that 
candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations. Respondents’ 
use of new information was considerably less affected by party identification in their treatment 
of new information. 
The two studies approached the research question from different angles. While chapter three 
estimated direct information effects in a controlled information environment, chapter four 
focused instead on overall information effects in a dynamic information environment. 




to a particular piece of information, whilst the latter was an exercise in accountancy, estimating 
the proportion of old and new information used, and the extent to which the latter is interpreted 
in a biased fashion.  
In addition to methodological differences, the studies explored the research question in different 
political contexts. Although similar in important ways, the Norwegian and German political 
systems are institutionally and culturally distinct. Perhaps more important than country 
differences is the fact that one study took place at the municipal level, and the other at the 
national level. It is possible that the dynamics of both party and candidate evaluations differ 
across these contexts. However, from the theoretical perspective, the main distinction of interest 
is between party and leader evaluations. Although the magnitude of the hypothesized effect 
might vary across contexts, there are no theoretical reasons to expect that the basic proposition 
that candidate evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations is 
contextual. Put together, the studies provide strong support for the conclusion that candidate 
evaluations are less susceptible to partisan bias than party evaluations. 
 
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
Comparisons of party and candidate evaluations appears a promising avenue for further research. 
The results of chapter three suggests that citizens use different information processing strategies 
when evaluating candidates and parties. However, the lack of post-treatment questions meant 
that it was unable to firmly establish the cognitive processes involved in each category. To get a 
better handle on the causal mechanisms at work, future studies on the topic should include 
variables commonly used to distinguish between online and memory-based information 
processing such as response latencies, measures of recall, attitude strength and the certainty of 
the evaluations (McGraw 2011) 
 
Besides further examination of the research question examined in this thesis, the theory of 
entitativity provides several opportunities for future research on political attitudes. As noted in 
chapter two, entitativity does not refer to the objective reality of the attitude object, but how it is 
constructed in the mind of the perceiver. It is well documented in the social psychology literature 




of group members and their unity of purpose. This is probably the case for parties too, and future 
research should examine which conditions influence the perceived entitativity of parties. In the 
context of the personalization literature, a particularly intriguing question is whether highly 
personalized parties that are closely associated with their leaders (so-called “charismatic parties” 
(Panebianco 1988)), are perceived as particularly entitative – and if so, how this affects citizen’s 
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Survey experiment – Norwegian version 
 
Party identity question 
Hvilke av følgende partier føler du deg nærmest? 
 
● Rødt 
● Sosialistisk Venstreparti 
● Arbeiderpartiet 
● Senterpartiet 
● Miljøpartiet De Grønne 
● Venstre 





Hvilke av følgende partier føler deg fjernest fra? 
● Rødt 
● Sosialistisk Venstreparti 
● Arbeiderpartiet 
● Senterpartiet 
● Miljøpartiet De Grønne 
● Venstre 



















A1.2 First vignette 
 
Se for deg at det går mot valg i din kommune. Under valgkampen skriver lokalavisen følgende 
om [arbeiderpartiets] [toppkandidat/lokalparti/tre fremste kandidater]: 
 
● [Kandidaten/Partiet/Den ene] har lagt frem en god plan for å forbedre kommunens veier 
og parker. 
● [Kandidaten/Partiet/Den andre] viser et oppriktig engasjement for kommunens 
innbyggere. 
● [Kandidaten/Partiet/Den tredje] har ifølge avisens meningsmåling høy tillit hos velgerne. 
 
Basert på informasjonen ovenfor, hva er ditt inntrykk av [kandidaten/partiet/partiet]? 
 
Misliker sterkt      Liker svært godt 




A2.2 Second vignette 
Uken før valget står en ny sak på trykk i lokalavisen. En lekkasje av intern korrespondanse 
avslører at [kandidaten/partiet/en av kandidatene] ikke har planer om å innfri sitt løfte om å 
forbedre kommunens veier og parker. 
 
I lys av denne nye informasjonen, hva er ditt inntrykk av [kandidaten/partiet/partiet]? 
 
Misliker sterkt      Liker svært godt 














Table A1 – Pairwise Tukey comparison of evaluations of each attitude object by party identity after 
exposure to the positive vignette 
 Estimate (SE) P. value 
In-group candidate(F) – In-group candidate (M) 0.296 (0.251) 0.9372 
In-group candidate(F) – In-group party (C) 0.1332 (0.257) 0.9996 
In-group candidate(F) –  In-group party (P) 0.1559 (0.254) 0.9987 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group candidate (F) 2.8386 (0.253) <.0001 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group candidate (M) 2.6961 (0.252) <.0001 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group Party (C) 3.6456 (0.254) <.0001 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group Party (Pur.) 3.5271 (0.261) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – In-group Party (C) -0.1629 (0.251) 0.9981 
In-group candidate(M) – In-group Party (P) -0.1401 (0.249) 0.9993 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group candidate (F) 2.5425 (0.248) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group candidate (M) 2.4001 (0.246) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group Party (C) 3.3504 (0.248) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group Party (P)  3.2311 (0.255) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – In-group Party (P) 0.0228 (0.255) 1.0000 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group candidate (F) 2.7054 (0.254) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group candidate (M) 2.5630 (0.252) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group Party (C) 3.5133 (0.254) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group Party (P) 3.3940 (0.261) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group candidate (F) 2.6826 (0.252) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group candidate (M) 2.5402 (0.250) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group Party (C) 3.4905 (0.252) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group Party (P) 3.3712 (0.259) <.0001 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group candidate (M) -0.1425 (0.249) 0.9992 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group Party (C) 0.8079 (0.251) 0.0284 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group Party (P) 0.6885 (0.258) 0.1329 
Out-group candidate (M) - Out-group Party (C) 0.9503 (0.249) 0.0036 
Out-group candidate (M) - Out-group Party (P) 0.8310 (0.256) 0.0268 






Table A2 – Pairwise Tukey comparison of evaluations of each attitude object by party identity after 
exposure to the negative vignette 
 Estimate (SE) P. value 
In-group candidate(F) – In-group candidate (M) 0.0692 (0.228) 1.0000 
In-group candidate(F) – In-group party (C) -1.0354 (0.234) 0.0003 
In-group candidate(F) –  In-group party (P) -0.9516 (0.231) 0.0011 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group candidate (F) 1.8314 (0.230) <.0001 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group candidate (M) 1.3709 (0.229) <.0001 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group Party (C) 1.6233 (0.230) <.0001 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group Party (P) 1.5661 (0.237) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – In-group Party (C) -1.1047 (0.229) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – In-group Party (P) -1.0208 (0.227) 0.0002 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group candidate (F) 1.7622 (0.225) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group candidate (M) 1.3017 (0.224) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group Party (C) 1.5541 (0.225) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group Party (P)  1.4969 (0.232) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – In-group Party (P) 0.0838 (0.232) 1.0000 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group candidate (F) 2.8669 (0.231) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group candidate (M) 2.4063 (0.230) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group Party (C) 2.6588 (0.231) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group Party (P) 2.6015 (0.238) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group candidate (F) 2.7831 (0.228) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group candidate (M) 2.3225 (0.227) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group Party (C) 2.5750 (0.229) <.0001 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group Party (P) 2.5177 (0.236) <.0001 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group candidate (M) -0.4606 (0.226) 0.4550 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group Party (C) -0.2081 (0.227) 0.9846 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group Party (P) -0.2653 (0.234) 0.9494 
Out-group candidate (M) - Out-group Party (C) 0.2525 (0.226) 0.9533 
Out-group candidate (M) - Out-group Party (P) 0.1952 (0.233) 0.9909 




Table A3 – Pairwise Tukey comparison of change in evaluations of each attitude object by party identity 
between the two opinion readings 
 Estimate (SE) P. value 
In-group candidate(F) – In-group candidate (M) -0.1941 (0.306) 0.9984 
In-group candidate(F) – In-group party (C) -1.1735 (0.312) 0.0045 
In-group candidate(F) –  In-group party (P) -1.1076 (0.309) 0.0085 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group candidate (F) -1.0153 (0.308) 0.0224 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group candidate (M) -1.3253 (0.306) 0.0004 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group Party (C) -2.0326 (0.308) <.0001 
In-group candidate(F) – Out-group Party (P) -1.9610 (0.317) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – In-group Party (C) -0.9794 (0.307) 0.0311 
In-group candidate(M) – In-group Party (P) -0.9135 (0.303) 0.0539 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group candidate (F) -0.8212 (0.302) 0.1176 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group candidate (M) -1.1312 (0.300) 0.0042 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group Party (C) -1.8386 (0.302) <.0001 
In-group candidate(M) – Out-group Party (P)  -1.7669 (0.311) <.0001 
In-group Party (C) – In-group Party (P) 0.0659 (0.310) 1.0000 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group candidate (F) 0.1582 (0.309) 0.9996 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group candidate (M) -0.1518 (0.307) 0.9997 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group Party (C) -0.8592 (0.309) 0.1019 
In-group Party (C) – Out-group Party (P) -0.7876 (0.318) 0.2066 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group candidate (F) 0.0923 (0.306) 1.0000 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group candidate (M) -0.2177 (0.304) 0.9965 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group Party (C) -0.9251 (0.306) 0.0524 
In-group Party (P) – Out-group Party (P) -0.8535 (0.315) 0.1206 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group candidate (M) -0.3100 (0.302) 0.9707 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group Party (C) -1.0174 (0.305) 0.0196 
Out-group candidate (F) - Out-group Party (P) -0.9458 (0.314) 0.0530 
Out-group candidate (M) - Out-group Party (C) -0.7074 (0.303) 0.2751 
Out-group candidate (M) - Out-group Party (P) -0.6358 (0.312) 0.4553 
Out-group Party (C) - Out-group Party (P) 0.0716 (0.314) 1.0000 
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